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The Future of Tax Audits? 
The Acceptance of Online-Based, Automated Tax Audits 












In this paper, we investigate the acceptance by taxpayers and tax auditors of voluntary e-audits, i.e., 
online-based, automated tax audits. Further, we analyze the effects of e-audits on trust in and power of 
tax authorities. Perceived benefits and shortcomings of e-audits for taxpayers and tax auditors may 
depend on the specific features of e-audits, which may not only affect adoption and endorsement but 
also influence the trust-power balance between taxpayers and tax authorities, ultimately affecting tax 
compliance. In an experimental survey among taxpayers and tax auditors, we focus on four specific 
features: data privacy, audit certainty, transparency, and independence from tax intermediaries. Results 
from multilevel models suggest that taxpayers’ acceptance indeed depends on these features, particularly 
on audit certainty, i.e., that an e-audit cannot be followed by a subsequent conventional tax audit of the 
same period. While these features appear to increase acceptance and trust by taxpayers, the same features 
cause concerns of tax auditors, who react with less support for e-audits and a perceived loss in power. 
These results indicate a mismatch between taxpayers’ and tax auditors’ perceptions about e-audits and 
tax compliance. Our study is among the first to investigate the effects of digitalization in tax 
administration and to include tax auditors’ views. Results are relevant to policymakers who wish to 
promote digitalization to foster tax compliance. Specifically, our study suggests that tax authorities 
should incorporate safeguards into e-audits and educate about the importance of a trusting relationship 
between taxpayers and tax auditors.  
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2 
The Future of Tax Audits?  
The Acceptance of Online-Based, Automated Tax Audits 
and their Effects on Trust and Power 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the acceptance by taxpayers and by tax auditors of voluntary, online-
based, automated tax audits (e-audits) and their effects on the perceived power of and trust in tax 
authorities. Addressing micro and small businesses in particular, such novel e-audit programs may invite 
taxpayers to regularly upload detailed, standardized accounting data (e.g., ledger and payroll data) to 
tax authorities’ online platforms. Using AI-powered analyses, including statistical methods and 
algorithms, e-audit programs may then identify outliers, ask for clarification, and subsequently assess 
income tax automatically and in a timely manner.1 Thereby, e-audits could extend several e-government 
programs of tax administration which already exist in various countries, building on e-filing systems 
such as ELSTER in Germany, e-File in the US, FinanzOnline in Austria, or myTax in Australia. 
Automation of tax audits is the foreseeable and probably unavoidable next step in the 
digitalization efforts of tax administrations for several reasons. First, tax authorities may be increasingly 
compelled to develop e-audit programs to reduce personnel costs and increase audit efficiency. 
Government statistics show a steady rise in the number of enterprises (see also OECD, 2019; by 13% 
between 2007 and 2018; Statistik Austria, 2020), while the number of employees in tax authorities 
continuously decreases (by 6% in the same period in Austria; Bundesministerium für öffentlichen Dienst 
und Sport, 2019). Clarification of whether and under which conditions taxpayers are willing to accept 
e-audits is thus crucial for the future development of tax administration.  
Second, e-audits can be seen as an expansion of the concept of cooperative compliance, which is 
characterized by increased transparency between taxpayers and tax authorities and which aims to 
provide more timely certainty and to reduce administrative costs for both taxpayers and tax authorities 
(OECD, 2013). However, cooperative compliance was originally designed for large businesses, whereas 
e-audits address in particular medium, small, and micro businesses that normally face a low audit 
probability. 
Third, e-audits may be regarded as a large-scale application and enhancement of computational 
and AI-based analysis of taxpayer data, which are already employed by tax authorities around the world 
to augment conventional tax audits (Centre for Public Impact, 2018; Hashimzade, Myles and Rablen, 
2016; OECD, 2019). E-audits can be expected to expand these already existing methods: They extend 
e-filing systems by the possibility to upload granular business data, they apply concepts of cooperative 
 
1 This approach differs from the Standard Audit File – Tax (SAF-T), developed by the OECD (2005) and 
implemented in Austria in 2009, whose only intention was to standardize data exchange between taxpayers and 
tax authorities during a conventional ex-post audit. 
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compliance to a much wider range of businesses, and they extend the statistical analysis of taxpayer data 
to much more granular data. 
Because e-audits constitute a paradigm shift in tax collection, voluntary utilization is likely to be 
the first step in their implementation. In the long term, and when voluntary adoption is successful, e-
audits may become mandatory. Successful implementation of e-audits thus requires broad acceptance, 
both from taxpayers and from tax auditors. In many countries, small and micro businesses are audited 
only rarely. Hence, switching to continuous, full disclosure of granular data constitutes a major 
disruption and a drastic increase in taxpayer supervision, which may be met with resistance. 
Furthermore, conventional tax audits still rely predominantly on the experience of and assessments by 
human tax auditors. Both taxpayers and tax auditors may thus have little faith in results from the 
automatic analysis of taxpayer data.  
On the other hand, e-audits promise benefits both to taxpayers and tax authorities. First, as in 
cooperative compliance, continuous monitoring and instantaneous feedback upon uploading data may 
increase certainty, preventing unexpected tax payments and unintentional non-compliance. Second, 
conventional filing of tax returns and subsequent tax audits cause administrative costs both for taxpayers 
and tax authorities. E-audits may improve efficiency for both sides by shifting some of the administrative 
burden to automated systems. Lastly, e-audits dramatically increase audit coverage all taxpayers 
utilizing the system, allowing tax authorities to focus their resources on non-compliant taxpayers.  
However, it is unclear if these possible benefits outweigh concerns about data privacy and audit 
accuracy so that both taxpayers and tax auditors will broadly accept and utilize e-audits. Nonetheless, 
acceptance of e-audits by taxpayers and tax auditors appears extremely relevant for their successful 
implementation. Low acceptance may not only threaten the utilization of e-audits but also disrupt other 
digitization efforts within tax authorities as well as the overall relationship between taxpayers and tax 
authorities. 
With regard to the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities, e-audits could also strongly 
affect the perceived power of and trust in tax authorities, which are the two main determinants of tax 
compliance as described in the slippery slope framework (Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008). On the one 
hand, the use of (e-government) services has been linked to higher trust in government and tax 
authorities (Gangl et al., 2013; Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006). E-audits can thus be expected to increase 
trust in tax authorities. On the other hand, governments have an inherent interest in obtaining citizens’ 
data (Fusi, 2020). Tax authorities may wish to facilitate the collection of taxpayer data, enabling data-
driven auditing to increase audit case selection and audit efficiency (OECD, 2016a, 2019). E-audits may 
thus be expected to shift the power balance in favor of tax authorities.  
Trust and power are interdependent (see Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008). One feature of e-
audits that increases power may have a detrimental impact on trustworthiness, and vice versa. For 
example, taxpayers may perceive e-audits as a disproportionate invasion of privacy, which could reduce 
their trust. Tax auditors, on the other hand, may expect deliberate misuse of e-audits by taxpayers. This, 
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in turn, may be seen as a loss in power to enforce tax compliance. As trust and power have repeatedly 
shown to be linked to tax compliance of citizens (e.g., Batrancea et al., 2019; Kogler, Muehlbacher and 
Kirchler, 2015), it appears important that e-audits do not negatively affect the trust-power balance 
between governments and taxpayers. 
Despite an increase in digitalization of tax administration, there are very few studies on e-
governance programs in the context of taxation (Carter et al., 2011; Floropoulos et al., 2010; Gotoh, 
2009; Hung, Chang and Yu, 2006; Stafford and Turan, 2011). In this study, we bridge this research gap 
by assessing the determinants influencing e-audit utilization and the effects of e-audits on the perceived 
trustworthiness and power of tax authorities among taxpayers and tax auditors.  
In an experimental questionnaire, we survey 331 business taxpayers and 530 tax auditors, 
presenting on screen randomly generated variations of a hypothetical but highly realistic e-audit 
program.2 The Austrian Ministry of Finance, the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, and the Federation 
of Austrian Industries supported this study by distributing the questionnaires and by providing feedback 
on the operationalization of e-audits and their features. The basic description of e-audits is constant 
across all variations and can be summarized as follows: Taxpayers can opt to upload data to tax 
authorities’ online platforms, which then automatically conduct tax audits, generate inquiries, if 
necessary, and finally assess the tax due. As randomized treatments, the presented e-audit programs vary 
in four distinct features, which are closely related to increased surveillance and cooperative compliance.  
The features, which are presented as either available or unavailable to participants, are: a) data 
privacy, which is operationalized as the deletion of uploaded data as soon as an e-audit is concluded or 
aborted, b) audit certainty, operationalized as the prohibition of conventional follow-up tax audits for 
periods that already underwent a successful e-audit, c) transparency, operationalized as a detailed 
explanation on how the audit result was generated, and d) independence, operationalized as the option 
to utilize the e-audit process without the help of a tax intermediary. We identify these features based on 
interviews with representatives of the Austrian Ministry of Finance. As all four features are closely 
related to recent developments in tax administration, we expect them to be particularly important. 
Moreover, we expect all four features to be decisive for the acceptance of e-audits as well as perceived 
trust in and power of tax authorities.  
To capture the acceptance of e-audits by taxpayers and tax auditors, we inquire about the 
behavioral intention to utilize (for business owners), to use or recommend utilization (for business 
employees), or to endorse implementation (for tax auditors) of the presented e-audit program. Moreover, 
we inquire about the perceived change in tax authorities’ power to enforce tax compliance and the 
perceived change in their trustworthiness. Each participant could respond to up to five rounds of e-audit 
programs with randomly generated combinations of features. Our research design allows us to assess 
 
2 The hypothetical e-audit process used in this study is based on a program currently in development by the 
Austrian Ministry of Finance. We base the operationalization of e-audits and their features on in-depth interviews 
with representatives of the Austrian Ministry of Finance. 
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both between-subject effects, i.e., the effect of the average treatment manifestation across participants, 
as well as within-subject effects, i.e., the effect of a change in treatments across rounds. The 
disaggregation of between- and within-subject effects enables us to test both the ad-hoc reactions to the 
availability of the four presented features, as well as the effects of a more deliberate comparison between 
their availability across rounds. 
With regard to behavioral intention, we find that, on average across all treatment manifestations, 
taxpayers indicate a 36% probability of using e-audits, while tax auditors indicate a 46% probability of 
endorsing e-audit implementation. With regard to perceived changes in trust and power, taxpayers 
express a significant overall increase in perceived power of tax authorities through e-audits and a minor 
but significant decrease in trust in tax authorities across all presented variants of e-audits. Tax auditors 
perceive the opposite: they indicate a significant decrease in authorities’ power and a significant increase 
in the perceived trustworthiness of tax authorities.  
Of the four experimental features, audit certainty contributes most to explaining behavioral 
intention, as well as to explaining the perceived changes in trust and power. On the side of taxpayers, 
audit certainty significantly increases behavioral intention and trust in the tax authorities, with no 
significant effect on perceived power. On the side of auditors, however, audit certainty significantly 
decreases behavioral intention as well as the perceived power of the tax authorities, with no significant 
effect on trust. We find these results as the effect of the average treatment manifestation (between-
subjects effect), suggesting that these effects are the result of ad-hoc reactions to the availability of audit 
certainty. We also find these results as the effect of changes in treatment manifestation across rounds 
(within-subjects effect), i.e., of comparing the availability of audit certainty across rounds. Taxpayers 
also significantly prefer e-audits with available data privacy, transparency, and independence, as 
captured by the within-subject effects. 
These results suggest strongly opposing views between taxpayers and tax auditors. Differences in 
reactions caution against implementing e-audits without considering both perspectives. On the side of 
taxpayers, the service character of e-audits appears particularly important. Implementing e-audits 
without direct benefits for taxpayers may be a missed opportunity to foster trust and compliance. On the 
other hand, tax auditors express considerable concern that such concessions may sacrifice power to 
detect tax evasion. In order to successfully implement e-audits, safeguards might thus be needed to 
alleviate these concerns. It also seems necessary to further analyze and better communicate the potential 
trust-related benefits and the actual risk of tax evasion due to e-audits. 
This study is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to examine under which conditions both 
taxpayers and tax auditors accept e-audits and how they may foster trust and power – important 
determinants of tax compliance – in the long run. Our study contributes to the literature in two important 
ways: It provides insights into novel approaches of tax collection and under which circumstances they 
can be successful. Our results underscore the importance of service-based measures such as cooperative 
compliance to foster tax compliance. Moreover, this study allows a direct comparison of taxpayers’ and 
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tax auditors’ reactions to e-audits, showing that concerns about compliance and services differ 
considerably between the two groups. Results should thus be of particular interest to tax authorities, 
informing digitalization efforts that improve efficiency without jeopardizing trust. Our results may also 
extend to other online and e-governance services, in which similar concerns about compliance and the 
trust-power balance may apply, for instance, insurance, healthcare, or employment. 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Trust and power in tax administration 
Economic models of tax compliance assume that citizens act egoistically and purely based on 
financial motivations when paying taxes. According to these early models, high audit probability and 
fines are thus the most important way to ensure tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
However, Allingham and Sandmo acknowledge that their model “…may perhaps be criticized for giving 
too little attention to nonpecuniary factors in the taxpayer’s decision on whether or not to evade taxes.” 
Indeed, subsequent research has shown that tax compliance is determined by a variety of factors, 
including social influence (e.g. Bobek, Hageman and Kelliher, 2013; Jimenez and Iyer, 2016),  personal 
and cultural differences (Hofmann et al., 2017; Torgler and Schneider, 2007), and the perceived 
behavior and trustworthiness of tax authorities (e.g. Cherney, 1997; Feld and Frey, 2002; Murphy, 
2004). 
Building on this increasing evidence that economic considerations alone cannot explain citizens’ 
tax compliance, Kirchler et al. (2008) developed the “slippery slope framework” (SSF) of tax 
compliance. The SSF integrates two contrasting motivations to comply with tax laws, distinguishing 
between voluntary and enforced motivations: Voluntary tax compliance stems from a sense of duty and 
a moral obligation towards society; enforced tax compliance stems from egoistic considerations and is 
mainly motivated by coercion (i.e., audits and fines). While the former subsumes determinants of tax 
compliance that are not based on financial and egoistic motivations, the latter mirrors the predictions of 
the economic models of tax compliance as outlined above. 
The SSF relates these two compliance motivations to the behavior of tax authorities, namely 
perceptions of their trustworthiness and power. Perceived power is described as the result of efficient 
detection of and strict penalties for tax evasion. Trust, on the other hand, is the result of fair procedures, 
adequate services, and benevolent conduct by the tax authorities.  
According to the SSF, in an interaction climate in which coercion (i.e., power) is the dominant 
strategy to increase tax compliance (“antagonistic climate”), taxpayers will be driven predominantly by 
egoistic motivations. In line with economic models of tax compliance, taxpayers will rationally 
maximize their income whenever possible, only complying if there is sufficient threat of audits and 
fines, which results in enforced tax compliance. However, as tax audits are costly, the SSF implies that 
it is inefficient for tax authorities to only rely on power to maximize tax compliance (Kirchler, Hoelzl 
and Wahl, 2008). In a trusting relationship (“synergistic climate”), taxpayers are more likely to consider 
taxes as a fair contribution to the public good, which results in voluntary tax compliance. However, a 
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fair amount of power of tax authorities still has to be present. As neither power nor trust alone can ensure 
an optimal level of tax compliance in the population, the SSF suggests a balanced combination of trust 
and power. 
The main predictions of the SSF, namely that trust leads to voluntary compliance and power to 
enforced compliance, have already been subject to extensive empirical testing (Batrancea et al., 2019; 
Kirchler, Kogler and Muehlbacher, 2014; Kogler et al., 2013; Kogler, Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2015; 
Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010; Muehlbacher, Kirchler and Schwarzenberger, 2011), with all cited 
studies consistently supporting the predictions.  
Current developments in tax administration show a global trend towards tax administrations, 
incorporating both trust and power in their approaches to tax collection. For example, in 2017, more 
than two thirds of the countries included in the 2019 Tax Administration Report (OECD, 2019) had 
initiatives in place to enhance the quality of their services for taxpayers. Furthermore, an increasing 
number of tax administrations reported the use of automated AI-based or statistical methods for the 
purpose of risk management, with data for such analysis coming from internal (e.g. tax declarations, 
cash register systems) and external sources (e.g., third parties such as other state agencies).  
As a prominent example of novel trust-based approaches to foster tax compliance, many 
jurisdictions offer cooperative compliance programs, which were originally developed for large 
businesses. In such programs, taxpayers commit to acting transparently towards tax authorities by 
disclosing relevant tax-related information and accounting data. To further ensure tax compliance, 
businesses are typically also required to employ advanced tax control frameworks (OECD, 2016b). Tax 
authorities, on the other hand, provide taxpayers with timely feedback on the interpretation of 
transactions and associated tax laws. Ideally, any tax issues are thus resolved when they arise, resulting 
in reduced risk of unexpected tax payments or litigation. Indeed, research has shown that large 
businesses perceive this improvement of certainty and the resulting reduction in tax risk as the primary 
advantage compared to conventional, ex-post tax audits (Eberhartinger and Zieser, 2020; e.g. Enachescu 
et al., 2019; Goslinga, Siglé and Veldhuizen, 2019). 
Conversely, the use of statistical or AI-based methods to analyze taxpayer data can be seen as a 
recent example of purely power-enhancing measures, as tax administrations use taxpayer data to 
augment tax auditing (OECD, 2016a, 2019). Due to the increasing amount of data available to tax 
authorities, such methods may significantly increase their capabilities to detect irregularities in 
accounting data and tax returns. However, questions about the treatment of taxpayer data (i.e., which 
data is stored, and for how long) are not only relevant with regard to audit efficiency but also concerning 
data privacy and security (Houser and Sanders, 2017; e.g. Laury and Wallace, 2005). 
Combining both the trust- and power-related aspects of these recent developments in tax 
administration, e-audits (i.e., automatic tax audits based on detailed accounting data) may be regarded 
as the next advancement in tax collection. Concerning power, e-audits may allow tax authorities to use 
comprehensive data-driven analyses by increasing the collection of taxpayer data at large scale. 
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Moreover, by drastically improving audit coverage, authorities have more resources available to focus 
manual tax auditing on non-compliant taxpayers. On the other hand, e-audits may offer benefits to 
taxpayers that foster trust, for example, by providing more certainty and transparency. Similar to 
cooperative compliance, e-audits may thus aim to promote a cooperative, synergistic climate between 
taxpayers and tax authorities.  
While there is ample evidence on the positive effects of enforcement and trust-related measures 
on tax compliance, very little is known about their potential effects in an e-governance context and how 
e-audits and their potential features are perceived by taxpayers and tax auditors. As outlined in the next 
section, this study thus focuses on different variants of an e-audit program that incorporates features of 
cooperative compliance and data-driven auditing to test the potential effects of e-audits on perceived 
trust and power, and on the acceptance of e-audits by taxpayers and tax auditors. 
2.2 Features of e-audits and hypotheses development 
To foster acceptance among taxpayers, the potential benefits of e-audits compared to conventional 
tax audits need to be communicated and understood. Similarly, for e-audits to be successful, tax auditors 
have to support their implementation, as they will be involved in developing and utilizing e-audits on 
the side of tax authorities. Despite a considerable number of studies on the adoption of e-government 
services (see Hofmann, Räckers and Becker, 2012; Rana, Dwivedi and Williams, 2015), no studies have 
yet examined the effects of service- and enforcement-related features on e-governance acceptance in a 
tax context. Given the specific context of tax administration, which includes strict confidentiality 
requirements in most countries, immediate cash consequences of tax payments, and drastic fines for 
non-compliance, we consider the tax environment a unique case of e-governance that requires further 
analysis. 
The present study examines the effects of four distinct features, which we expect to be particularly 
relevant from the perspectives of data-driven auditing and cooperative compliance. The features were 
operationalized after in-depth interviews with representatives of the Austrian Ministry of Finance3 and 
are as follows: 
a) Data privacy: Data uploaded by taxpayers for the purpose of an e-audit is deleted after the e-audit 
is concluded; 
b) Audit certainty: Follow-up tax audits are prohibited unless there is serious evidence of abuse; 
c) Transparency: Users receive a detailed explanation of how the e-audit result was obtained; 
d) Independence: Taxpayers can opt to use e-audits without employing tax intermediaries. 
As outlined in greater detail below, we expect that all four features increase the perceived service 
quality provided by tax authorities and reduce the perceived probability with which tax authorities can 
detect tax evasion. Based on the predictions of the SSF, we thus expect that among both taxpayers and 
tax auditors all features will increase the perceived trustworthiness of tax authorities and decrease the 
 
3 The Austrian Ministry of Finance envisages the implementation of voluntary e-audits. At the time of our 
analysis, e-audits were not yet implemented. Austria is among the first countries to develop e-audits. 
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perceived power of tax authorities. Furthermore, we expect both better services and lower enforcement 
to be reflected in increased acceptance by taxpayers. However, despite partial evidence that tax auditors 
are aware of trust- as well as power-related motivations of taxpayers (Gangl et al., 2019), it is unclear 
how tax auditors judge the relative importance of services and enforcement in the context of their own 
profession. For tax auditors, we thus do not make predictions about the effects of the four features on 
their acceptance of e-audit implementation but explore the respective relationships.  
Feature a), data privacy, is related to the increasing utilization of data-driven auditing by tax 
authorities and to the transparency requirement of cooperative compliance. Uploading accounting data 
renders business processes and transactions more transparent and may thus make tax auditing more 
efficient and accurate. In the case of e-audits, data made available by taxpayers may further enable tax 
authorities to match transactions of different taxpayers and conduct more comprehensive statistical 
analyses at a later point in time. However, such a use of data may be limited by data privacy measures 
(i.e., if taxpayer data is deleted directly after an e-audit). On the one hand – in line with the economic 
models of tax compliance – taxpayers might perceive data privacy as an opportunity to evade taxes. On 
the other hand, data privacy may also be perceived as a sign of service orientation and trust by tax 
authorities. In contrast, storing data indefinitely may be regarded as a disproportionate invasion of 
privacy, which could decrease trust. Therefore, we expect data privacy to negatively affect power and 
to positively affect trust among both taxpayers and tax auditors. Among taxpayers, we also expect data 
privacy to lead to higher acceptance of e-audits.  
Feature b), audit certainty, is closely related to cooperative compliance programs. Assuming that 
taxpayers perceive conventional tax audits and the risk of unexpected tax payments as costly, we expect 
that granting audit certainty (i.e., the guarantee that no further audits of the same period will take place) 
will be perceived as a considerable improvement of service quality, which leads to increased trust. At 
the same time, audit certainty may be regarded as a significant reduction in power to detect tax evasion, 
diminishing the threat of random or unexpected audits. Indeed, research suggests that taxpayers react to 
audit certainty with decreased tax compliance (Muehlbacher et al., 2012). As with data privacy, we 
expect audit certainty to positively influence perceived trustworthiness and to negatively influence 
power among both taxpayers and tax auditors. Among taxpayers, we expect audit certainty to positively 
affect the acceptance of e-audits. 
Feature c), transparency, can be understood as increased communication with taxpayers to reduce 
uncertainty about the interpretation of audit results. As in cooperative compliance programs, improved 
communication may facilitate data preparation and efforts to comply with tax laws, enhancing service 
quality. However, transparency about audit routines might also facilitate manipulating uploaded data in 
a way that minimizes taxpayers’ tax burden. Again, we expect transparency to decrease the perceived 
power of financial authorities and to increase their perceived trustworthiness among both taxpayers and 
tax auditors. Among taxpayers, we expect transparency to increase acceptance of e-audits.  
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Feature d), independence, can also be related to cooperative compliance. Just as tax control 
frameworks are essential for cooperative compliance programs, in order to minimize the risk that 
taxpayers upload incorrect data, taxpayers using e-audits may be required to employ tax intermediaries 
for e-audits. This, however, may be perceived as unnecessary compliance costs by taxpayers, decreasing 
their acceptance of e-audits.  Because the feature independence was phrased to be completely voluntary, 
we expect independence to be perceived as a potential benefit that allows taxpayers to save costs if they 
wish to do so. Similar to the three other features, independence may be interpreted as a service to 
taxpayers and a sign of trust. On the other hand, tax intermediaries act as supervisory agents who 
promote their clients’ tax compliance. As with the three other features, we expect independence to 
positively influence trust and negatively affect perceived power among both taxpayers and tax auditors. 
Among taxpayers, we again expect that independence leads to higher acceptance of e-audits. 
In summary, we expect both taxpayers and tax auditors to react to all four features with increased 
perceived trustworthiness of tax authorities and decreased perceived power of tax authorities to detect 
tax evasion. Moreover, we also expect all four features to increase acceptance (i.e., expected utilization) 
of e-audits among taxpayers. We thus hypothesize:  
H1a-d: The features (data privacy, audit certainty, transparency, and independence) have a 
positive effect on the perceived trustworthiness of tax authorities both in the groups of taxpayers and 
tax auditors. 
H2a-d: The features (data privacy, audit certainty, transparency, and independence) have a 
negative effect on the perceived power of tax authorities both in the groups of taxpayers and tax auditors. 
H3a-d: The features (data privacy, audit certainty, transparency, and independence) have a 
positive effect on taxpayers’ acceptance of e-audits. 
3. Method 
3.1  Procedure and participants 
We used an experimental online questionnaire among Austrian taxpayers and tax auditors. The 
operationalization of e-audits and their potential features was developed based on in-depth interviews 
with representatives of the Austrian Ministry of Finance. In a pre-test phase, ten tax experts, three 
business owners as well as representatives of the Austrian Economic Chamber, of the Austrian Ministry 
of Finance, and of the Austrian Chamber of Tax Advisors provided feedback on the comprehensibility 
of the presented e-audit program, its features, and all questionnaire items. Feedback from this pilot phase 
concerned minor details in the wording of the scenario and items and was incorporated in the final 
version of the questionnaire. We empirically analyze the responses to test our hypotheses, 
complementing hypothesis tests by an explorative analysis to shed further light on tax auditor´s 
perceptions. 
Taxpayers were invited by the Federation of Austrian Industries and by the Austrian Chamber of 
Commerce. The Austrian Ministry of Finance invited tax auditors. Among Austrian taxpayers, we 
acquired responses from self-employed and incorporated taxpayers of various sizes. Within the Austrian 
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tax authorities, a large number of tax auditors responsible for business taxation with direct contact to 
taxpayers (both off-site and on-site auditors) participated in the survey. Data collection took place from 
October 2019 to January 2020. 
Overall, we collected responses from 861 participants. 530 of ca. 1,800 invited tax auditors 
participated in the survey (29%). Taxpayers were invited by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce via 
their decentralized newsletters,4 and by the Austrian Federation of Industries via e-mail,5 resulting in 
331 taxpayer responses. Table 1 displays sociodemographic data by group as well as additional statistics 
for the group of taxpayers. Our respondents are predominantly male, especially in the group of 
taxpayers, and above the age of 50; taxpayer respondents are largely business owners of micro-, small- 
and medium-sized enterprises. In this regard, participants appear representative of the target population 
of automated tax audits, which generally are micro-, small- and medium-sized businesses. 
 
 Taxpayers (N = 331)   Tax auditors (N = 530)  Total sample (N = 861) 
 N %  N %  N % 
Gender         
Female 76 23.0  223 42.1  299 34.7 
Male 255 77.0  307 57.9  562 65.3 
Age         
< 20 1 0.3  2 0.4  3 0.3 
20-29 13 3.9  112 21.1  125 14.5 
30-39 45 13.6  62 11.7  107 12.4 
40-49 89 26.9  108 20.4  197 22.9 
50-59 115 34.7  212 40.0  327 38.0 
60-69 56 16.9  34 6.4  90 10.5 
> 69 12 3.6  0 0.0  12 1.4 
Position in business         
Owner 295 89.1       
Employee 36 10.9       
Business sales in Euro         
< 35.000 68 20.5       
35,000 – 100,000 72 21.8       
100,000 – 220,000 65 19.6       
222,000 – 700,000 46 13.9       
700,000 – 10 Mil. 53 16.0       
10 Mil. – 40 Mil. 12 3.6       
40 Mil. – 200 Mil. 6 1.8       
200 Mil. – 1 Billion 4 1.2       
> 1 Billion 5 1.5       
Table 1: Sociodemographic data by group and business characteristics. 
 
3.2 Material 
The experimental questionnaire was implemented online in German. Using a responsive layout 
for the questionnaire’s design, we ensured that participants could comfortably complete the 
experimental questionnaire on desktop computers and mobile devices with smaller screens. The 
 
4 The exact number of invitees, and the response rate, are therefore not available. In 2019, the Austrian 
Chamber of Commerce had 537.636 members, including double counts (membership per state, membership in 
several states is possible). 
5 A link to the survey was sent via e-mail to ca. 150 financial experts of ca. 135 companies. 
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questionnaire had four parts: i) demographics, ii) baseline measures, iii) description of e-audit programs 
(including experimental treatments) and repeated measures, and iv) open questions. All items were 
phrased identically for all respondents, except for the automatically branching sociodemographic section 
and the item measuring the acceptance of e-audits (see below).  
 Following the sociodemographic section, baseline items measured participants’ perception of 
trust in and power of tax authorities as well as general perceptions about the tax system and respondents’ 
motives to pay taxes. Items for the constructs of trust and power were adapted from Erard et al. (2019) 
and from Kogler et al. (2015). All items were answered on a five-point Likert-type scale. 
Participants were then presented with the first of up to five rounds containing a description of a 
hypothetical e-audit program, namely that the process is voluntary, that accounting data has to be 
uploaded to the servers of the tax administration, and that the data is assessed automatically. 
Furthermore, each round differed in four features. Randomized across participants and rounds, each of 
the four features was either presented as available or as unavailable. The order in which features were 
presented was also randomized within each round to prevent potential order effects. This means that in 
each of the up to five rounds in which e-audits were assessed by participants, four features were 
displayed in random order, each being displayed at random as either available or as unavailable. The 
features were presented as available [unavailable] as follows: 
a) Data privacy: After finishing the audit process, all data supplied to the tax authorities will be 
deleted permanently. [Accounting data provided by the taxpayer will be stored by the tax 
authorities. Data will not be deleted even if the audit process is aborted.] 
b) Audit certainty: After a tax return has been successfully generated based on the uploaded 
accounting data, future tax audits for the respective year of assessment are prohibited. This only 
applies if potential irregularities in the accounting data could be clarified online. [Even if a tax 
return has been successfully generated in the digital audit process, a conventional tax audit can 
still take place at a later time.] 
c) Transparency: After finishing the audit process, taxpayers receive information about how the 
audit result was generated. [Taxpayers are only informed about the result of the digital audit. No 
additional information about the audit process is provided.] 
d) Independence: Taxpayers may use the process independently and without the assistance of tax 
professionals. [To use the digital audit process, taxpayers need to be represented by a tax 
intermediary, because only tax intermediaries can upload accounting data.] 
Directly after reading the description of the process, which included the randomly displayed set 
of features, participants responded to items adapted from the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of 
Technology (Venkatesh, Morris and Davis, 2003). As a measure of their overall acceptance of e-audits, 
participants first indicated their behavioral intention, i.e., their likelihood to utilize (for business 
owners), to utilize or recommend utilization (for business employees), or to endorse (for tax auditors) 
the process as described. The indication was given in steps of five percentage points via a slider from 0 
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to 100%. Subsequently, participants indicated whether they believed the automated tax audit process 
was easy to use (effort expectancy), provided benefits for themselves (performance expectancy), and 
whether they believed to receive sufficient support in using the process or not. In addition, participants 
were asked to indicate whether they expected the results of the presented e-audit process to be correct. 
Following this, participants indicated the perceived change in the trustworthiness and power of 
tax authorities due to the e-audits in items adapted from the baseline measures of trust and power 
described above. Further, participants indicated the perceived change of the complexity, uncertainty, 
effort, and compliance costs. Perceived change was indicated on a 5-point scale ranging from -
2 (negative change) to +2 (positive change).  
After finishing the questions to the first scenario, participants were invited to respond to a second 
variation of the e-audit program, i.e., a second round that included the identical items but a newly 
randomized combination of the four features. Following this second round, participants could complete 
up to three more rounds, i.e., a maximum of five rounds in total, or choose to quit the survey after each 
round. The majority of participants completed two rounds (see Table 2 for statistics on the number of 
completed rounds). After finishing the main part of the survey, participants could answer open questions, 
namely what they liked best about the described process, what they found most problematic, and how 
the process could improve.  
 
 Number of rounds completed  
Group 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 


















Table 2: Number of participants by number of rounds completed. This table displays the number of participants 
by the number of completed rounds, the cumulative number of participants who completed at least the respective 
number of rounds (in parentheses), and the mean number of completed rounds among taxpayers and tax auditors. 
 
While the questionnaire covered a wider range of potential outcomes as well as open questions, 
we focus our main analysis on the items measuring behavioral intention and perceived change of 
trustworthiness and power of tax authorities, as these measures are the most suitable indicators for the 
overall acceptance and for the potential effects on tax compliance, respectively. Other items and scales, 
however, are used for additional analyses and robustness checks. 
Table 3 displays means and standard deviations of all measures used in the main analysis. Means 
of responses in behavioral intention show that, across all treatments and rounds, taxpayers indicate a 
36% probability of using e-audits, while tax auditors indicate a 46% probability of endorsing the 
implementation of e-audits. In other words, the likelihood to use or endorse e-audits is, overall, below 
50%. Average responses in the scales change of trust and change of power show a perceived increase in 
the trustworthiness of tax authorities and a perceived decrease in the power of the tax authorities in the 
group of tax auditors. Taxpayers perceive the opposite: a comparably strong increase in power and a 
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slight decrease in trust through e-audits. Cronbach’s Alphas indicate acceptable to good internal 
consistencies of the four three-item scales used in the analysis. 
 
 Taxpayers  Tax auditors 
Scales/Items Mean SD 
Cronbach’s  
Alpha  Mean SD 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
 Single measures 
Trust (baseline) 3.14 0.96 .85  4.02 0.69 .68 
Power (baseline) 3.44 0.81 .69  2.63 0.74 .67 
 Repeated measures 
Behavioral intention 35.96 33.25 -  45.61 30.66 - 
Change of trust -0.09 0.79 .85  0.16 0.65 .74 
Change of power 0.32 0.70 .70  -0.16 0.84 .80 
Participants 331  530 
Observations 742  1285 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. This table displays means, standard deviations, and 
internal consistencies (Cronbach’s Alpha) for scales and items used in the analysis on the participant level for 
single measures and the observation level for repeated measures. Means of repeated measures are thus grand means 
across observations, Cronbach’s Alphas for the repeated measures represent the overall internal consistencies 
across all rounds. 
4. Analysis and results 
While we aimed at measuring the constructs of interest as similarly as possible in the groups of 
taxpayers and tax auditors, we assume that their responses reflect fundamentally different perspectives 
and cannot be compared statistically. Therefore, we do not conduct formal tests of differences between 
the two groups but provide a qualitative comparison of responses and reactions to treatments.  
To test the effects of the four features on the acceptance of e-audits (operationalized as the 
behavioral intention to use or endorse e-audits) and on the perceived change of power and 
trustworthiness of the tax authorities, we thus estimate separate multilevel models using maximum 
likelihood estimation with random intercepts for each of the dependent variables in both the groups of 
taxpayers and tax auditors. Besides the random intercept, we only estimate fixed (i.e., participant-
invariant) effects for all covariates included in the model.  
Multilevel models are better suited than other alternatives (such as fixed-effects regressions, 
pooled regressions, or repeated-measures ANOVA) because participants could respond to up to five 
different versions of the e-audit process, with the four experimental treatments data privacy, audit 
certainty, transparency, and independence varying across rounds. Observations are thus clustered within 
participants; responses by the same participants are not independent and may be correlated. Using 
multilevel models with random intercepts, we are able to disaggregate the variance in responses as well 
as in the experimental treatments into two levels, namely Level 1 (observation-level or within-subjects 
variance), and Level 2 (participant-level or between-subjects variance).  
Variance on Level 1 reflects changes in participants’ responses across rounds, which may be 
caused by changes in treatments independently from the average level of responses or treatments. 
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Level 2 variance, on the other hand, reflects variation in the average response by each participant, which 
may be caused not only by participant characteristics but also by the average manifestation of the 
randomized treatments. By allowing covariates on both levels, multilevel models allow the simultaneous 
estimation of “average” effects on the subject level (Level 2), and of the “effects of change” on the 
observation level (Level 1).  
Appendix 2 outlines a general multilevel model with a random intercept (Equations 1-3), variance 
components of our dependent variables (Equation 4 and Table 10), transformations of independent 
variables (Equations 5 and 6), and the full multilevel models used in our main analyses (Equations 7 and 
8). 
To further confirm results from our main analyses, we conduct complementary analyses using 
additional dependent variables and robustness checks, including split-sample analyses and fixed-effects 
regressions. The following sections present variables used in the analyses, descriptive results, results of 
the multilevel models for both the groups of taxpayers and tax auditors, as well as additional analyses 
and robustness checks. 
4.1 Dependent variables 
We measure i) BehavioralIntention, either as the indicated probability (in percent) to use, use or 
recommend utilization, or endorsing e-audit implementation among the groups of business owners, 
business employees, and tax auditors, respectively. In our main analyses, we do not distinguish between 
business owners and business employees, but employee status is included as a control variable as 
outlined below. We further measure ii) the 3-item scale TrustChange, which assesses the change of trust 
in the tax authorities due to the presented e-audit, and iii) the 3-item scale PowerChange, indicating the 
change of perceived power of the tax authorities due to the e-audit. Scales of the latter two variables 
were constructed as the mean of these 5-point items, with values from -2 to +2 indicating a negative or 
positive perceived change. All dependent variables are presented in Table 9 in Appendix 1. 
Correlations between the dependent variables give a first indication of participants’ reactions to 
the different e-audit processes (see Table 4). Only in the group of tax auditors, correlations suggest that 
BehavioralIntention is strongly associated with PowerChange. In the group of taxpayers, on the other 
hand, the BehavioralIntention is more strongly associated with TrustChange.  
 
 BehavioralIntention TrustChange PowerChange 
BehavioralIntention - .29 .53 
TrustChange .45 - .28 
PowerChange .09 .17 - 
Table 4: Correlations between dependent variables. This table displays intercorrelations between the dependent 
variables for all observations within the subsample of taxpayers and the subsample of tax auditors. Cells above the 
diagonal show correlations for tax auditors, below the diagonal for taxpayers. All correlations are significant at 
p < .05. 
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4.2 Independent variables 
Our independent variables are the four experimental features DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, 
Transparency, and Independence, as well as a small number of additional explanatory variables. All 
variables used in the models, including their measurements and transformations, are presented in Table 
8 in Appendix 1. 
Each experimental treatment was dummy coded: When a feature was presented as available, it 
was assigned the value 1 (0 if unavailable). To disaggregate observation- and subject-level variance of 
the treatments, each of these indicator variables is included twice in the model, first on Level 1 as the 
deviation from the participant mean to only capture the change in treatments (participant-centered, 
denoted by xPC; see Equation 6 in Appendix 2), and second on Level 2 as the participant average (denoted 
by x̄) to only capture the average treatment manifestation. All Level 2 variables are entered as the 
deviation from the grand mean (grand mean centered; denoted by xGMC; see Equation 7 in Appendix 2), 
so that the model intercept reflects the overall mean of observations. 
As an additional observation-level (Level 1) covariate, we also include the participant-centered 
variable RoundPC into the model. As other explanatory covariates on Level 2, we include the baseline 
measures of Trust (TrustBaselineGMC) and perceived power of the tax authorities (PowerBaselineGMC), 
each measured once at the beginning of the experiment on 3-item scales from 1 (low) to 5 (high). We 
also include the completed number of rounds for each participant (RoundsGMC). Moreover, only in the 
group of taxpayers, we include the 8-category item measuring business sales (SalesGMC) and the 
participants’ position in the business (EmployeeGMC), coded 1 for employees and 0 for business owners. 
Continuous sociodemographic variables were measured in intervals to protect participants’ privacy (see 
Table 1). 
4.3 Descriptive results  
Figure 1 gives a first intuition of our results. For taxpayers, the availability of each feature 
increases BehavioralIntention (Panel A), as indicated by mean differences larger than zero in Panel C, 
in particular for data privacy and audit certainty. For tax auditors, the opposite is true. Each feature’s 
availability reduces BehavioralIntention (Panel B; negative mean differences in Panel D), particularly 
audit certainty. 
 




Figure 1: Mean values and mean differences in the dependent variable BehavioralIntention by treatments. Panels A 
and B display mean values of BehavioralIntention by treatment manifestation, showing the mean response in 
rounds in which the respective feature was presented as available or unavailable for the groups of taxpayers (Panel 
A) and tax auditors (Panel B). Panels C and D show the mean differences from Panels A and B, i.e., the mean 
differences between rounds with the respective feature presented as available or unavailable for the groups of 
taxpayers (Panel C) and tax auditors (Panel D). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Table 5 shows mean responses and standard deviations of the three dependent variables from the 
subsamples of rounds in which the four features (data privacy, audit certainty, transparency, and 
independence) were either all displayed as available at the same time or as unavailable. While these 
rounds cover only a small part of the whole sample, they provide insights into the potential magnitude 
of differences caused by the four features. Indeed, most dependent variables exhibit large differences in 
mean responses depending on the presented features of e-audits. Among taxpayers, the average 
BehavioralIntention is much higher in rounds where all features were presented as available (46%) than 
in rounds with none of the features available (19%). Taxpayers also indicated a reduction in tax 
authorities’ trustworthiness (TrustChange) if no feature was available. With regard to perceived changes 
in power (PowerChange), there is only a minor difference, with slightly higher perceived increases in 
power when all features were available. Conversely, tax auditors reported much higher 
BehavioralIntention in rounds where no feature was available (56%) than in rounds where all features 
were available (33%). While there is only a negligible difference in TrustChange, tax auditors indicate 
a distinct reduction of power (PowerChange) in rounds with all features presented as available.  
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   Dependent variables 
   BehavioralIntention  TrustChange  PowerChange 
Features Observations  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
 Taxpayers 
All features available 48  46.25 32.62  -0.03 0.78  0.44 0.64 
No feature available 43  19.07 24.84  -0.47 0.94  0.34 0.94 
Data privacy 
          
Available 374  40.08 33.82  -0.01 0.77  0.30 0.68 
Unavailable 368  31.91 32.22  -0.17 0.80  0.34 0.71 
Audit certainty           
Available 370  42.92 34.28  0.04 0.79  0.34 0.67 
Unavailable 372  30.04 31.13  -0.22 0.78  0.30 0.72 
Transparency           
Available 371  38.52 33.45  -0.08 0.77  0.34 0.65 
Unavailable 371  33.41 32.90  -0.10 0.81  0.30 0.74 
Independence           
Available 385  37.29 33.02  -0.05 0.76  0.35 0.65 
Unavailable 357  34.54 33.48  -0.13 0.82  0.29 0.75 
Total 742  35.96 33.25  -0.09 0.79  0.32 0.70 
 Tax auditors 
All features available 84  32.74 27.99  0.18 0.71  -0.64 0.87 
No feature available 81  55.56 32.06  0.21 0.62  0.04 0.80 
Data privacy  
         
Available 636  44.33 30.42  0.18 0.65  -0.24 0.85 
Unavailable 649  46.86 30.86  0.14 0.65  -0.08 0.82 
Audit certainty           
Available 647  39.83 30.08  0.18 0.67  -0.32 0.86 
Unavailable 638  51.47 30.14  0.13 0.64  0.01 0.78 
Transparency           
Available 642  44.28 30.65  0.17 0.68  -0.23 0.85 
Unavailable 643  46.94 30.63  0.14 0.63  -0.09 0.82 
Independence           
Available 643  44.88 30.26  0.16 0.68  -0.18 0.84 
Unavailable 642  46.35 31.05  0.16 0.63  -0.14 0.83 
Total 1285  45.61 30.66  0.16 0.65  
-0.16 
0.84 
Table 5: Means and standard deviations of dependent variables by experimental treatments. This table displays 
mean responses and standard deviations of the dependent variables BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and 
PowerChange by treatments and group. Statistics are calculated across observations. 
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Table 5 also shows means and standard deviations for all four features separately, contrasting 
rounds in which either of the four features was available or unavailable (i.e., independently from the 
status of the other three features).  
The direction of treatment effects appears to be consistent across all four features: if any of the 
features was presented as available, taxpayers tended to react with higher values in BehavioralIntention 
and TrustChange, and tax auditors with lower values in BehavioralIntention and PowerChange. In line 
with Figure 1, in the group of taxpayers, a major portion of the differences appears to be caused by only 
two features, namely data privacy, and audit certainty. Among tax auditors, audit certainty appears to 
be the main determinant of BehavioralIntention, while the three features data privacy, audit certainty, 
and transparency appear responsible for the reduction in perceived power.  
These descriptive results provide a first indication of the reactions to e-audits and the effects of 
e-auditing features. However, they do distinguish between the ad-hoc assessment of features (subject-
level effects) and reactions to changes in treatments across rounds (observation-level effects). We thus 
use multilevel models to disaggregate treatment effects into the subject and observation level. The 
following section details the results from these models. 
4.4 Results from multilevel models 
Table 6 and Table 7 show results of the multilevel models with BehavioralIntention, 
TrustChange, and PowerChange as dependent variables for the groups of taxpayers and tax auditors, 
respectively. Mean responses in the dependent variables across all treatments and rounds are reflected 
in the model intercepts. Effects of our randomized treatments (i.e., the effect of the availability of each 
feature) are reflected in the coefficients of the features.  
Treatment effects are disaggregated into two levels: once on Level 1 as the effects of a change in 
the availability of each feature (e.g., the effect of DataPrivacyPC), once on Level 2 as the response to the 
average availability of each treatment per participant (e.g., the effect of DataPrivacy!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!GMC). Other effects 
of participant-level variables also enter the models on Level 2 (e.g., TrustBaselineGMC). 
Results from taxpayers 
In the group of taxpayers (see Table 6), the intercept of BehavioralIntention indicates an average 
probability of utilization of e-audits of 36%. As reflected by the intercepts of TrustChange and 
PowerChange, taxpayers perceive e-audits to significantly increase tax authorities’ power, and to reduce 
their trustworthiness.  







Intention  TrustChange 
 
PowerChange 
Fixed effects B SE  B SE  B SE 
Level 1 (within participants) 
Intercept 35.96*** 1.73  -0.09** 0.04  0.32*** 0.04 
!"#"$%&'"()!" 11.52*** 1.77  0.20*** 0.05  -0.03 0.04 
*+,&#-.%#"&/#)!" 13.57*** 1.75  0.18*** 0.05  -0.01 0.04 
0%"/12"%./()!" 6.01*** 1.81  0.05 0.05  0.06 0.04 
3/,.2./,./(.!" 4.34** 1.79  0.02 0.05  0.02 0.04 
45+/,!" -1.31 0.83  -0.01 0.02  -0.01 0.02 
Level 2 (between participants) 
!"#"$%6'"()77777777777777777#$" 1.16 4.68  0.13 0.10  -0.05 0.10 
*+,6#-.%#"6/#)777777777777777777777#$" 9.38* 4.84  0.25** 0.11  0.04 0.10 
0%"/12"%./()7777777777777777777#$" 3.83 4.53  0.02 0.10  -0.01 0.09 
3/,.2./,./(.7777777777777777777#$" -3.65 4.66  0.02 0.10  0.11 0.10 
45+/,1#$" -2.42 1.48  -0.03 0.03  -0.05 0.03 
0%+1#8"1.9&/.#$" 5.32*** 1.73  0.26*** 0.04  0.09** 0.04 
$5:.%8"1.9&/.#$" 0.80 2.08  -0.01 0.05  0.07* 0.04 
;"9.1#$" 1.29 0.91  0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02 
<=295)..#$" 1.49 3.57  0.06 0.08  -0.04 0.07 
Random effects σ2  σ2  σ2 
Between variance ("!") 679.24  0.31  0.28 
Residual variance ("#2) 347.08  0.23  0.18 
Observations 742  742  742 
Participants 331  331  331 
Table 6: Multilevel regressions in the group of taxpayers on the dependent variables BehavioralIntention, 
TrustChange, and PowerChange. The models include a random intercept which controls for between-subject 
variance, effectively disaggregating the variance of the dependent variable into Level 1 variance (within 
participants, capturing the variation across rounds), and Level 2 variance (capturing the variation across 
participants). Variance of the four randomized treatments DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence (all being assigned the value 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 if unavailable) was 
disaggregated by participant-mean centering (denoted by xPC) on Level 1, and by using the participant means on 
Level 2 (denoted by x̄). To facilitate interpretation of the intercept, all variables on Level 2 were entered as grand-
mean-centered (denoted by xGMC). The models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *… p < .10, 
**… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
 
We find that the experimental treatments DataPrivacy and AuditCertainty show the strongest 
within-subject effects (Level 1), both significantly increasing BehavioralIntention as well as 
TrustChange. The other two experimental factors Transparency and Independence only show 
significant and positive effects on BehavioralIntention. On the between-subject level (Level 2), 
however, AuditCertainty is the only treatment with a significant effect, again increasing 
BehavioralIntention and TrustChange. Regarding power, we find that taxpayers do not indicate a 
significant increase or decrease in the perceived power of the tax authorities that is due to any of the 
four treatments.  
These results suggest that taxpayers react less strongly in their global assessment of the presented 
e-audit processes than when they reacted to changes from one version to another, with only the treatment 
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audit certainty showing a consistent effect on both levels. Nevertheless, when confronted with both the 
available and unavailable versions of the four features, participants significantly prefer all four features 
to be available, with data privacy and audit certainty also significantly increasing perceived trust in the 
authorities.  
Regarding other explanatory variables, we find significant effects of TrustBaseline, which is 
positively associated with all three dependent variables, in particular BehavioralIntention, and 
TrustChange. In other words, taxpayers who already display high trust in tax authorities are more likely 
to use e-audits and react to e-audits with higher increases in trust. 
In the group of taxpayers, we thus find evidence for hypotheses H1a and H1b, as the features data 
privacy and audit certainty significantly increased taxpayers’ perceived trustworthiness of the 
authorities. Our results also support hypotheses H3a-d, as taxpayers appear to react with higher 
acceptance of e-audits when each of the four features was presented as available. We do not find any 
evidence for H2a-d, as taxpayers do not indicate any significant changes in tax authorities’ power due 
to the availability of the four features.  
Results from tax auditors 
In the group of tax auditors, results appear markedly different than in the group of taxpayers (see 
Table 7). In the variable BehavioralIntention, tax auditors indicate an average probability of endorsing 
e-audits of 46%. In contrast to taxpayers, tax auditors perceive e-audits to significantly increase trust 
and reduce power. BehavioralIntention and TrustChange are also significantly reduced over rounds, as 
indicated by the negative coefficient of Round (on Level 1) in Table 7. Significant coefficients of Rounds 
(on Level 2) also indicate that tax auditors with more negative reactions in all four dependent variables 
tended to complete more rounds of the experiment. 
On the within subject-level (Level 1), AuditCertainty significantly decreases BehavioralIntention 
as well as PowerChange. Transparency, on the other hand, shows no effect on BehavioralIntention, but 
positive effects on TrustChange. On the between-subject level (Level 2), all treatments except 
Independence have a significant and negative effect on PowerChange. Moreover, AuditCertainty and 
Transparency show negative effects on BehavioralIntention. As opposed to taxpayers, results suggest 
that tax auditors react negatively to the same feature that made e-auditing most attractive to taxpayers, 
namely audit certainty: Tax auditors express a smaller likelihood to endorse e-audits and a significant 
loss in power to detect tax evasion should audit certainty be available.  
With regard to the baseline measures of TrustBaseline and PowerBaseline, results also stand in 
contrast to the results in the group of taxpayers. We find that the perceived power of the authorities is 
associated with a significant increase in all three dependent variables, while TrustBaseline does not 
show any significant effects. This means that tax auditors expect a stronger gain (or smaller reduction) 
in power and trust and are more likely to endorse e-audits if they believe that tax authorities already 
have the power to efficiently detect tax evasion. 
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In the group of tax auditors, results support H1c because tax auditors perceive a significant 
increase in tax authorities’ trustworthiness when e-audits are more transparent. We find clear support 
for H2b, as tax auditors indicate a decrease in tax authorities’ power when e-audits provide audit 
certainty. We also find limited evidence for H2a and H2c, as there are negative effects of data privacy 
and transparency on the perceived change of power on the between-subject level, but not on the within-
subject level. This means that tax auditors did not react with significant changes in their assessments 






Intention  TrustChange  PowerChange 
Fixed effects B SE  B SE  B SE 
Level 1 (within participants) 
Intercept 45.61*** 1.16  0.16*** 0.03  -0.16*** 0.03 
!"#"$%&'"()!" -0.09 1.39  0.05* 0.03  -0.06 0.04 
*+,&#-.%#"&/#)!" -15.52*** 1.37  0.05 0.03  -0.43*** 0.04 
0%"/12"%./()!" -0.04 1.39  0.12*** 0.03  -0.04 0.04 
3/,.2./,./(.!" -1.48 1.39  -0.02 0.03  0.03 0.04 
45+/,!" -2.37*** 0.62  -0.06*** 0.01  0.02 0.02 
Level 2 (between participants) 
!"#"$%6'"()77777777777777777#$" -4.32 3.29  0.02 0.07  -0.21** 0.09 
*+,6#-.%#"6/#)777777777777777777777#$" -5.95* 3.33  0.06 0.07  -0.19** 0.09 
0%"/12"%./()7777777777777777777#$" -5.75* 3.28  -0.11 0.07  -0.26*** 0.09 
3/,.2./,./(.7777777777777777777#$" -1.12 3.24  0.07 0.07  -0.10 0.09 
45+/,1#$" -3.40*** 0.94  -0.04* 0.02  -0.04 0.03 
0%+1#8"1.9&/.#$" 0.01 1.65  0.03 0.04  -0.04 0.04 
$5:.%8"1.9&/.#$" 7.00*** 1.51  0.12*** 0.03  0.30*** 0.04 
Random effects σ2  σ2  σ2 
Between variance ("!") 457.36  0.23  0.32 
Residual variance ("#2) 382.83  0.18  0.28 
Observations 1285  1285  1285 
Participants 530  530  530 
Table 7: Multilevel regressions in the group of tax auditors on the dependent variables BehavioralIntention, 
TrustChange, and PowerChange. The models include a random intercept which controls for between-subject 
variance, effectively disaggregating the variance of the dependent variable into Level 1 variance (within 
participants, capturing the variation across rounds), and Level 2 variance (capturing the variation across 
participants). Variance of the four randomized treatments DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence (all being assigned the value 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 if unavailable) was 
disaggregated by participant-mean centering (denoted by xPC) on Level 1, and by using the participant means on 
Level 2 (denoted by x̄). To facilitate interpretation of the intercept, all variables on Level 2 were entered as grand-
mean-centered (denoted by xGMC). The models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *… p < .10, 
**… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
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4.5 Additional analyses and robustness checks 
Analyses with additional dependent variables 
To better explain results from our main analyses with the dependent variables 
BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange, we compute identical multilevel level models 
with four other dependent variables (see Table 9 in Appendix 1 for variable descriptions). First, 
PerformanceExpectancy measures whether participants perceived a subjective benefit through the e-
audit process on a scale from 1 to 5. Second, CorrectResults measures whether participants expected 
results from the presented e-audit process to be accurate on a scale from 1 to 5. Third, 
UncertaintyChange measures whether participants perceive a positive or negative change in uncertainty 
in the tax system on a scale from -2 to +2. Fourth, CostsChange measures whether participants expected 
a positive or negative change in compliance costs on a scale from -2 to +2. Results for taxpayers and tax 
auditors are presented in Table 11 and Table 12 in Appendix 3. 
Results from these additional multilevel regressions shed additional light on taxpayers’ and tax 
auditors’ reactions to e-audits. We find that taxpayers perceive data privacy and particularly audit 
certainty to be beneficial for them individually, as captured by the effects on PerformanceExpectancy, 
and that they expect audit certainty to significantly reduce uncertainty and compliance costs. However, 
across all treatments, taxpayers perceive e-audits to significantly increase compliance costs as indicated 
by the significant positive intercept of CostsChange. With regard to independence from tax 
intermediaries, taxpayers appear to expect a compliance cost reduction from this feature while at the 
same time experiencing a slight increase in uncertainty. This suggests that taxpayers indeed value the 
option to use e-audits without (costly) tax intermediaries, while they still expect increased certainty from 
their support. 
Tax auditors, surprisingly, also perceive audit certainty as well as transparency as a benefit in 
their professional capacity, as can be seen from the significant positive effects on 
PerformanceExpectancy. However, they expect results from e-audits to be significantly less correct if 
later ex-post audits are prohibited (audit certainty), and, to a smaller degree, if data must be deleted (data 
privacy). Regarding UncertaintyChange, tax auditors do not indicate any significant changes. Moreover, 
tax auditors expect e-audits to increase compliance costs overall, also expecting independence from tax 
intermediaries to reduce costs. Considering these results, tax auditors’ negative reactions to the feature 
concerning PowerChange and BehavioralIntention appear to stem primarily from concerns about the 
accuracy of e-audits and not from expected personal disadvantages.  
Sample splits 
To ensure that results from the experimental treatments found in our main analyses hold across 
large (sales over Euro 200,000) and small businesses (sales under Euro 200,000), across business owners 
and business employees, as well as across gender and age, we conduct group comparisons using 
likelihood-ratio tests. To this end, we specify two-group models in which regression coefficients are 
either free to vary between the two subsamples (which corresponds to a separate analysis of the two 
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subsamples) or are constrained to be equal (which corresponds to a joint analysis). We then compute 
likelihood-ratio tests that compare model fit between the constrained and unconstrained two-group 
models. As age and gender are not included as predictors on Level 2 in our main analysis, we also 
constrain intercepts for these two variables to test whether overall means in responses are significantly 
different. To conduct these group comparisons, we apply the same multilevel models as in our main 
analyses, but we limit the independent variables to the four experimental features on Level 1 and Level 2 
as well as the variables RoundPC and RoundsGMC.   
As outlined in more detail below, results from these group comparisons indicate that there are no 
significant differences in treatment effects between large and small businesses, between business 
employees and business owners, lending support to the generalizability of our results across a wide 
range of businesses. Moreover, we find no differences in results across gender and age, expect for the 
dependent variable TrustChange, where we find differences in regression coefficients between older 
and younger participants both among taxpayers and tax auditors, and differences in means among tax 
auditors. 
First, we construct subsamples from the variable Sales within the sample of taxpayers, which 
results in 463 participants in the subsample with sales under Euro 220,000 and 279 participants 
indicating sales over Euro 220,000. Between these two groups, we find no significant reduction in fit 
due to constraining regression coefficients (all p ≥ .60) for any of the dependent variables 
BehavioralIntention, TrustChange or PowerChange, which indicates that there are no significant 
differences in regression coefficients between taxpayers with high or low sales. 
Second, we construct subsamples from the variable Employee within the sample of taxpayers. We 
find no significant differences in regression coefficients between business employees and business 
owners in the effects on BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange (all p ≥ .25) , which 
indicates that there are no significant differences in treatment effects between employees and business 
owners. 
Third, we compare the results of female and male participants among taxpayers (76 female, 255 
male) and tax auditors (223 female, 307 male). Constraining regression coefficients and intercepts to be 
equal results in no significant difference in fit between female and male participants. This indicates that 
– both among taxpayers and tax auditors – there are no significant differences in the overall mean 
responses (as reflected in the intercepts) or in the treatment effects on the dependent variables 
BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange (all p ≥ .53). 
Fourth, using the categorical variable age, we compare results of taxpayers younger than 50 (148 
participants) or 50 years and older (183 participants), and of tax auditors younger than 50 (284 
participants) or 50 years and older (246 participants). Constraining regression coefficients and intercepts 
across age groups does not significantly reduce fit for the dependent variables BehavioralIntention or 
PowerChange, indicating no significant differences in regression coefficients or intercepts (all p ≥ .18). 
However, for the dependent variable TrustChange, we find significant differences in regression 
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coefficients between younger and older participants, both among taxpayers and tax auditors, and in the 
mean responses among tax auditors (all p < .10).  
Among tax auditors, older participants appear to react with higher perceived increases in trust to 
e-audits overall and with lower perceived increases in trust to changes of transparency and audit 
certainty (as reflected by within-subject effects on Level 1). However, in their overall reactions 
(between-subject effects on Level 2) older participants appear to react with stronger increases in trust to 
the feature audit certainty. Older taxpayers, on the other hand, appear to react with smaller increases in 
trust to the changes in the features data privacy and audit certainty and with stronger increases to changes 
in the feature transparency. With regard to Level 2 effects, older taxpayers show stronger increases in 
trust due to the feature transparency. Overall, these differences suggest interaction effects, i.e., that the 
effects of the presented features on the perceived trustworthiness of tax authorities depend on age. 
Alternative regression models 
To test whether the four features (data privacy, audit certainty, transparency, and independence) 
show interaction effects, i.e., whether the availability (or unavailability) of one feature influences the 
effect of another feature on our main dependent variables, we run pooled regressions (not tabulated) 
which include all possible first-, second-, and third-order interaction terms. We find no significant 
interaction effects with p < .10. 
To confirm the validity of results from multilevel models in Level 1 and on Level 2, we also 
conduct analyses using a variety of regression models and subsamples. To confirm observation-level 
(within-subject) effects, we conduct fixed-effects regressions, which control for variation between 
subjects and rounds by including an indicator variable for each participant and each round (see Table 13 
and Table 14 in Appendix 3). We repeat these analyses with data only from the first two rounds to rule 
out that results are driven by the subset of participants who completed more than two rounds (see Table 
15 and Table 16 in Appendix 3). Overall, coefficients from these fixed-effects regressions show only 
small differences compared to within-subject coefficients from multilevel models and thus confirm our 
results from the main analysis.  
Moreover, to confirm Level 2 (participant-level or between-subject) coefficients of our four 
features, we compute conventional multiple regressions, averaging treatment variables and dependent 
variables of each participant across rounds (see Table 17 and Table 18 in Appendix 3). Here, results 
closely reflect Level 2 coefficients of the multilevel models. Furthermore, we conduct regressions with 
data only from the first round of each participant (see Table 19 and Table 20 in Appendix 3) to test 
whether the initial reactions by participants to the four features confirm between-subject results from 
multilevel models. Some differences in treatment effects suggest that participants’ ad-hoc reactions were 
sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker than in subsequent rounds. Nevertheless, results still confirm 
our main analyses, reflecting the importance of the feature audit certainty in particular. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this study, we use an experimental questionnaire to test the acceptance of e-audits and its effects 
on the perceived power and trustworthiness of tax authorities among taxpayers and tax auditors. We 
present a hypothetical but realistic e-audit program, an online-based audit process in which taxpayers 
can opt to upload detailed accounting data regularly to an online platform of tax authorities and obtain 
an automatic tax audit and assessment of the tax due. As randomized treatments, we present different 
variants of this process with randomly generated combinations of four features, namely a) data privacy 
(taxpayer data is deleted after using the process), b) audit certainty (follow-up audits of a period for 
which an e-audit has been successfully conducted are prohibited), c) transparency (taxpayers receive 
information about how the audit results were obtained), and d) independence (taxpayers can use e-audits 
without tax intermediaries). 
We find that taxpayers indicate a 36% behavioral intention of using e-audits across all treatments, 
while tax auditors indicate 46% behavioral intention of endorsing the implementation of e-audit; overall 
acceptance thus appears rather low. Furthermore, taxpayers generally appear to perceive e-audits as an 
enforcement measure, indicating an overall increase in power and a reduction in the trustworthiness of 
the authorities. In contrast, tax auditors perceive e-audits to cause an overall decrease in power and an 
increase in trustworthiness. However, these reactions to e-audits strongly depend on the specific features 
incorporated into e-audits. 
The availability of the four features contributes significantly and positively to taxpayers’ 
acceptance of e-audits. In this regard, audit certainty, i.e., the assurance that no later conventional audit 
may take place, appears to be the most important feature for taxpayers, followed by data privacy, i.e., 
the assurance that all data will be deleted from the tax administration´s servers. Both audit certainty and 
data privacy also significantly increase taxpayers’ perceived trustworthiness of tax authorities, while 
none of the features appear to negatively impact the perceived power of tax authorities. Group 
comparisons indicate that these results hold across large and small businesses, across business owners 
and business employees, as well as across gender and age. However, we do find some differences 
between younger and older participants for the perceived change in tax authorities’ trustworthiness that 
indicate interaction effects of our treatments and age.  
In light of ample evidence that trust is an important predictor of voluntary tax compliance, our 
results suggest that voluntary e-audits can indeed foster voluntary tax compliance for both small and 
large businesses, provided that they are combined with service-oriented features for taxpayers. Indeed, 
similar to the perceived benefits of cooperative compliance programs by large businesses (see 
Eberhartinger and Zieser, 2020), taxpayers seem to highly value certainty and a reduced risk of 
unexpected tax payments or litigation. Furthermore, taxpayers react negatively to a considerable 
expansion of data retention, responding with higher acceptance and trust to e-audit programs only when 
taxpayer data is deleted. However, counter to our predictions, taxpayers do not perceive any of the tested 
features to reduce tax authorities’ power. From the perspective of taxpayers, results thus indicate that e-
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audit programs should generally include strong service- and trust-enhancing features and should provide 
tax certainty in particular. 
In contrast to taxpayers, tax auditors react particularly negatively to audit certainty. Losing the 
possibility to conduct conventional ex-post audits leads to a smaller likelihood of endorsing e-audits and 
a significant reduction in the perceived power of tax authorities. This may indicate that tax auditors are 
suspicious of taxpayers’ integrity and fear that e-audits might be misused for tax evasion purposes. In 
group comparisons, results from tax auditors hold across age and gender, again with the exception of 
perceived change in tax authorities’ trustworthiness, where we find some differences in result between 
younger and older participants. 
Overall, tax auditors appear to be primarily concerned about a loss of power. As e-audits may 
represent a considerable change in tax auditors’ duties, they may be concerned about their professional 
future, particularly when follow-up (manual) audits are prohibited. Tests with additional dependent 
variables indicate that tax auditors are especially concerned about the correctness of the results of e-
audits when additional ex-post audits are prohibited. These results suggest that tax auditors have genuine 
concerns that e-audits may be unintentionally misapplied or even abused by taxpayers. 
Taken together, results suggest that taxpayers and tax auditors have opposing concerns when 
evaluating e-audits: While taxpayers appear particularly interested in features that increase service 
quality and trust, tax auditors are concerned about a potential loss of power to detect tax evasion, with 
the loss of ex-post audits being particularly divisive. This interpretation of results is also in line with 
associations between the baseline measures of perceived trust and power and acceptance of e-audits: 
Taxpayers with high trust in tax authorities indicate significantly higher acceptance of e-audits, while 
perceived power is not associated with acceptance. In contrast, tax auditors who perceive tax authorities 
to be powerful indicate significantly higher acceptance of e-audits. 
The two perspectives of taxpayers and tax auditors appear difficult to reconcile. While the slippery 
slope framework suggests that services and trust play an important role in promoting tax compliance, it 
also emphasizes that a fair amount of enforcement is necessary to ensure compliance. In our sample, 
however, taxpayers do not appear to be concerned about power or to consider potential opportunities to 
misuse e-audits. Indeed, as suggested by the model of responsive regulation (Braithwaite, 2012), the 
majority of taxpayers can be expected to be inherently honest and not interested in deliberate tax evasion. 
Taxpayers should thus be supported through information and services. Tax auditors, however, may be 
focusing on the small minority who might actually misuse e-audits, which may affect their perception 
of taxpayers in general. 
Our results suggest that e-audits should include features derived from cooperative compliance 
that increase their service quality to promote a successful implementation of e-audits and positive effects 
on tax compliance. Increased data collection and monitoring through e-audits, in contrast, may be 
counterproductive and cause reduced trust by taxpayers. From the perspective of tax auditors, who 
appear concerned about incorrect results and abuse of e-audits by dishonest taxpayers, our results 
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suggest that certain safeguards should be implemented to alleviate these concerns. For example, similar 
to cooperative compliance, e-audits could be made available only to those taxpayers who have proven 
to be compliant in the past. Moreover, it appears necessary to clearly communicate actual risks as well 
as trust-related benefits of e-audits, both within the tax authorities as well as externally, to bridge the 
gap between taxpayers’ and tax auditors’ perceptions. 
Our study is subject to several general limitations. First, our sample consists only of Austrian 
taxpayers and tax auditors, which may limit the generalizability of results in other countries. However, 
the description of the program and its features could be applied to most other jurisdictions with little 
alterations, and our results may be of interest to tax administrations in other industrialized countries with 
high overall tax compliance and high standards of tax confidentiality. As e-audits are a novel concept 
both for Austrian taxpayers and tax auditors, we also expect that reactions were not driven by 
preconceived opinions about e-audits. Second, while the description of the presented e-audit program 
was discussed with the Austrian Ministry of Finance, it was hypothetical and had to be condensed to 
limit the time needed to complete the survey. As we have focused on a limited number of potential e-
audit features, it is likely that other aspects of e-audits not covered in our study have an additional impact 
on the acceptance and effects of e-audits. Absolute results in particular, such as the average behavioral 
intention to use e-audits, may therefore vary with other features not tested in this study. Third, while we 
used an experimental design to allow causal inferences, we were not able to observe actual behavior, 
nor can we rule out that participants self-selected into the survey based on their pre-existing opinions 
about taxation. Moreover, results may be skewed towards socially desirable answers and not reflect 
actual (intended) behavior or attitudes by taxpayers or tax auditors. While we acknowledge these 
limitations, we are convinced that our results are reliable and relevant, and informative for future 
research and policy design. 
As one of the first studies examining e-audits as a major future development in tax collection, our 
study contributes to the literature in two ways: First, it gives important insights into novel approaches 
to tax collection, providing further evidence on the importance of the delicate balance between service- 
and enforcement-based methods to improve tax compliance. Second, our study provides a direct 
comparison of taxpayers’ and tax auditors’ opinions, showing that the two groups react in opposite ways 
to some aspects of the same policies. In light of the increasing importance of data-driven e-governance, 
our results are of interest to tax authorities, allowing better informed digitalization efforts that improve 
efficiency as well as trust.  
  




Allingham, M.G. and Sandmo, A. (1972) ‘Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis’, Journal of Public 
Economics, 1(3-4), pp. 323–338. 
Batrancea, L. et al. (2019) ‘Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations’, 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 74, p. 102191. 
Bobek, D.D., Hageman, A.M. and Kelliher, C.F. (2013) ‘Analyzing the role of social norms in tax 
compliance behavior’, Journal of Business Ethics, 115(3), pp. 451–468. 
Braithwaite, V. (2012) ‘A new approach to tax compliance’, in Braithwaite, V. (ed.) Taxing Democracy: 
Routledge, pp. 1–11. 
Bundesministerium für öffentlichen Dienst und Sport (2019) Das Personal des Bundes 2019. Wien. 
Carter, L. et al. (2011) ‘The role of security and trust in the adoption of online tax filing’, Transforming 
Government: People, Process and Policy, 5(4), pp. 303–318. 
Centre for Public Impact (2018) Artificial intelligence in taxation: A case study on the use of AI in 
government. https://resources.centreforpublicimpact.org/production/2019/01/CPI-AI-Case-Study-
Taxation.pdf  (Accessed: 6 January 2021). 
Cherney, A. (1997) ‘Trust as a regulatory strategy: A theoretical review’, Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice, 9(1), pp. 71–84. 
Eberhartinger, E. and Zieser, M. (2020) ‘The effects of cooperative compliance on firms’ tax risk, tax 
risk management and compliance costs’, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 
2020-07. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612959 
Enachescu, J. et al. (2019) ‘Horizontal Monitoring in Austria: subjective representations by tax officials 
and company employees’, Business Research, 12(1), pp. 75–94. 
Erard, B., Kasper, M. and Kirchler, E. (2019) ‘What influence do IRS audits have on taxpayer attitudes 
and perceptions? Evidence from a national survey.’, in Internal Revenue Service (ed.) Annual 
Report to Congress 2018, pp. 78–130. 
Feld, L.P. and Frey, B.S. (2002) ‘Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated’, Economics of 
Governance, 3(2), pp. 87–99. 
Floropoulos, J. et al. (2010) ‘Measuring the success of the Greek taxation information system’, 
International Journal of Information Management, 30(1), pp. 47–56. 
Fusi, F. (2020) ‘When local governments request access to data: Power and coordination mechanisms 
across stakeholders’, Public Administration Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13307 
Gangl, K. et al. (2013) ‘"How can I help you?" Perceived service orientation of tax authorities and tax 
compliance’, FinanzArchiv, 69(4), p. 487. 
Gangl, K. et al. (2019) ‘The Relationship between austrian tax auditors and self-employed taxpayers: 
Evidence from a qualitative study’, Frontiers in Psychology, 10, p. 1034. 
Goslinga, S., Siglé, M. and Veldhuizen, R. (2019) ‘Cooperative compliance, tax control frameworks 
and perceived certainty about the tax position in large organisations’, Journal of Tax 
Administration, 5(1), 41-65. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3769337
 
30 
Gotoh, R. (2009) ‘Critical factors increasing user satisfaction with e-government services’, Electronic 
Government, an International Journal, 6(3), p. 252. 
Hashimzade, N., Myles, G.D. and Rablen, M.D. (2016) ‘Predictive analytics and the targeting of audits’, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 124, pp. 130–145. 
Hofmann, E. et al. (2017) ‘Tax compliance across sociodemographic categories: Meta-analyses of 
survey studies in 111 countries’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 62, pp. 63–71. 
Hofmann, S., Räckers, M. and Becker, J. (2012) ‘Identifying factors of e-government acceptance - A 
literature review’. 33rd International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2012). 
Houser, K.A. and Sanders, D. (2017) ‘The use of big data analytics by the IRS: Efficient solutions or 
the end of privacy as we know it?’ Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 
19(4), p. 817. 
Hung, S.-Y., Chang, C.-M. and Yu, T.-J. (2006) ‘Determinants of user acceptance of the e-Government 
services: The case of online tax filing and payment system’, Government Information Quarterly, 
23(1), pp. 97–122. 
Jimenez, P. and Iyer, G.S. (2016) ‘Tax compliance in a social setting: The influence of social norms, 
trust in government, and perceived fairness on taxpayer compliance’, Advances in Accounting, 34, 
pp. 17–26. 
Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E. and Wahl, I. (2008) ‘Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The “slippery 
slope” framework’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(2), pp. 210–225. 
Kirchler, E., Kogler, C. and Muehlbacher, S. (2014) ‘Cooperative Tax Compliance’, Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 23(2), pp. 87–92. 
Kogler, C. et al. (2013) ‘Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: Testing the assumptions 
of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia’, Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 34, pp. 169–180. 
Kogler, C., Muehlbacher, S. and Kirchler, E. (2015) ‘Testing the “slippery slope framework” among 
self-employed taxpayers’, Economics of Governance, 16(2), pp. 125–142. 
Laury, S. and Wallace, S. (2005) ‘Confidentiality and taxpayer compliance’, National Tax Journal, 
58(3), pp. 427–438. 
Muehlbacher, S. et al. (2012) ‘Uncertainty resolution in tax experiments: Why waiting for an audit 
increases compliance’, The Journal of Socio-Economics, 41(3), pp. 289–291. 
Muehlbacher, S. and Kirchler, E. (2010) ‘Tax compliance by trust and power of authorities’, 
International Economic Journal, 24(4), pp. 607–610. 
Muehlbacher, S., Kirchler, E. and Schwarzenberger, H. (2011) ‘Voluntary versus enforced tax 
compliance: empirical evidence for the “slippery slope” framework’, European Journal of Law and 
Economics, 32(1), pp. 89–97. 
Murphy, K. (2004) ‘The role of trust in nurturing compliance: a study of accused tax avoiders’, Law and 
Human Behavior, 28(2), pp. 187–209. 
OECD (2013) Co-operative Compliance: A Framework: From Enhanced Relationship to Co-operative 
Compliance. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3769337
 
31 
OECD (2016a) Advanced Analytics for Better Tax Administration. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2016b) Co-operative Tax Compliance: Building Better Tax Control Frameworks. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
OECD (2019) Tax Administration 2019: Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and 
Emerging Economies. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Rana, N.P., Dwivedi, Y.K. and Williams, M.D. (2015) ‘A meta-analysis of existing research on citizen 
adoption of e-government’, Information Systems Frontiers, 17(3), pp. 547–563. 
Stafford, T.F. and Turan, A.H. (2011) ‘Online tax payment systems as an emergent aspect of 
governmental transformation’, European Journal of Information Systems, 20(3), pp. 343–357. 
Statistik Austria (2020) Statistik zur Unternehmensdemografie. Wien. Available at: http://
www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/wirtschaft/unternehmen_arbeitsstaetten/
unternehmensdemografie_ab_2015/index.html (Accessed: 6 January 2021). 
Tolbert, C.J. and Mossberger, K. (2006) ‘The Effects of e-government on trust and confidence in 
government’, Public Administration Review, 66(3), pp. 354–369. 
Torgler, B. and Schneider, F. (2007) ‘What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from 
multicultural European countries’, Social Science Quarterly, 88(2), pp. 443–470. 
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M.G. and Davis, G.B. (2003) ‘User acceptance of information technology: 
Toward a unified view’, MIS Quarterly, 27(3), pp. 425–478. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3769337
 
32 
Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Level 1 variables Description Measurement/coding Questionnaire items Transformation 
!"#"$%&'"()!" The uploaded data is deleted after 
completing or aborting the e-audit 
process. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise; 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant-centered* 
*+,&#-.%#"&/#)!" Conventional audits are prohibited 
for a business year already 
successfully audited via an e-audit. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise; 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant-centered* 
0%"/12"%./()!" Taxpayers receive an audit protocol 
detailing how the e-audit result was 
obtained. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise, 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant-centered* 
3/,.2./,./(.!" Taxpayers are permitted to utilize e-
audits without the involvement of 
tax intermediaries. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise; 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant-centered* 
45+/,!" Captures the round in which 
participants responded to the 
presented e-audit process. 
Index ranges from 1 (first 
round) to 5 (last possible 
round). 
- Participant-centered* 
Level 2 variables 
!"#"$%6'"()77777777777777777#$" The uploaded data is deleted after 
completing or aborting the e-audit 
process. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise; 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant average, 
grand-mean-centered† 
*+,6#-.%#"6/#)777777777777777777777#$" Conventional audits are prohibited 
for a business year already 
successfully audited via an e-audit. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise; 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant average, 
grand-mean-centered† 
0%"/12"%./()7777777777777777777#$" Taxpayers receive an audit protocol 
detailing how the e-audit result was 
obtained. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise, 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant average, 
grand-mean-centered† 
3/,.2./,./(.7777777777777777777#$" Taxpayers are permitted to utilize e-
audits without the involvement of 
tax intermediaries. 
Assumes 1 if presented as 
available, 0 otherwise; 
randomized in each round. 
- Participant average, 
grand-mean-centered† 
45+/,1#$" The number of rounds completed by 
a participant. 
Values from 1 to 5 assigned 
to each participant. 
- Grand-mean-centered† 
0%+1#8"1.9&/.#$" Perceived trustworthiness of the 
Austrian tax authorities. 
3-item scale from 1 
(completely disagree) to 5 
(completely agree); measured 
once at the beginning of the 
experiment. 
- Austrian tax authorities are trustworthy 
- Austrian tax authorities have good intentions towards 
taxpayers. 
- Austrian tax authorities act in the interest of 
taxpayers. 
Grand-mean-centered† 
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$5:.%8"1.9&/.#$" Perceived power of the Austrian tax 
authorities to enforce tax 
compliance. 
3-item scale from 1 
(completely disagree) to 5 
(completely agree); measured 
once at the beginning of the 
experiment. 
- Austrian tax offices have extensive means to enforce 
tax compliance. 
- Austrian tax authorities detect almost every 
irregularity in tax declarations. 
- Austrian tax authorities impose high penalties for tax 
evasion. 
Grand-mean-centered† 
;"9.1#$" Approximate sales (turnover) of 
participants’ businesses.  
One item from 1 (< 35,000 
Euro) to 8 (> 1 Billion Euro); 
measured once at the 
beginning of the experiment 
(taxpayers only). 
 Grand-mean-centered† 
<=295)..#$" Captures whether participants are 
owners or employees of their 
businesses. 
One item, assumes 1 if 
participant is owner of the 
business, 0 otherwise; 
measured once at the 
beginning of the experiment 
(taxpayers only). 
 Grand-mean-centered† 
Table 8: Independent variables used in the analysis. This table shows descriptions, original variable measurement and coding, as well as transformations for the multilevel models 
of all independent variables used in the analyses. *… see Equation 5 in Appendix 2; †… see Equation 6 in Appendix 2.  
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Dependent variables Description Measurement/coding Questionnaire items 
8.ℎ"'&5%"93/#./#&5/ Indicated probability of using, using or recommending 
utilization, or endorsing e-audit implementation among 
the groups of taxpayers, and tax auditors, respectively. 
Probability in percentage 
points, steps of 5 
 
0%+1#-ℎ"/?. The change of trust in the authorities due to the presented 
e-audit. 
3-item scale from -2 to+2 - Austrian tax offices are more/less 
trustworthy. 
- Austrian tax offices have better/worse 
intentions towards taxpayers. 
- Austrian tax offices act more/less in the 
interest of taxpayers. 
$5:.%-ℎ"/?. The change of perceived power of the tax authorities due 
to the e-audit. 
3-item scale from -2 to+2 - Austrian tax offices have more/less 
means to enforce tax compliance. 
- Austrian tax offices detect more/less 
irregularities in tax declarations. 
- Austrian tax offices impose 
higher/lower penalties for tax evasion. 
$.%@5%="/(.<A2.(#"/() 
 
The change of perceived subjective benefits through the e-
audit process. 
One item from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely 
agree) 
- I believe the audit process offers 
advantages for me. 
-5%%.(#4.1+9#1 Measures whether participants expected results from the 
presented e-audit process to be accurate. 
One item from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely 
agree) 
- I believe the results of the audit process 
are correct. 
B/(.%#"&/#)-ℎ"/?. Measures whether participants perceive a positive or 
negative change in uncertainty in the tax system. 
One item from -2 to +2 - Paying taxes in Austria is linked to 
more/less legal uncertainty. 
-51#1-ℎ"/?. measures whether participants expected a positive or 
negative change in compliance costs. 
One item from -2 to +2 - Paying taxes in Austria is more/less 
costly. 
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Appendix 2: Multilevel models, variance components, and variable transformations 
Multilevel models with a random intercept 
Equations 1 and 2 show the separate observation- and participant-level parts of a general random 
intercept model with one observation-level and one participant-level explanatory variable, with 
subscripts j and i denoting clusters (in our case, participants) and observations, respectively. 
 
(1)      !!" =	$" +	$#&!" + 	'!" 
'!" 	~	)(0, -$%) 
 
(2)      $" =	0& + 0#1" +	2" 	 
2" 	~	)(0, -'%) 
 
In Equation 1, observations of the dependent variable !!" on Level 1 are explained by the 
participant intercept $", a fixed (i.e., participant-invariant) effect $# of an observation-level explanatory 
variable &!", and the observation-level error '!". In Equation 2, the participant intercept $" on Level 2 is 
modeled by the overall intercept 0&, an effect 0# of a participant-invariant explanatory variable 1", and 
the random error 2", which reflects the deviation of each participant intercept $" from the overall 
intercept. Substituting $" in Equation 1 with the right side of Equation 2 results in the full random 
intercept model: 
 
(3)     !!" =	0& + $#&!" + 0#1" +	2" + 	'!" 	 
2" 	~	)(0, -'%) 
'!" 	~	)(0, -$%) 
 
In Equation 3, observations of the dependent variable !!" are thus explained by the overall 
observation intercept 0&, a fixed effect $# of an observation-level explanatory variable &!", a fixed effect 
0# of a participant-level explanatory variable 1", the random participant-level error terms 2" with 
variance -'%,  and the random residual observation-level error 	'!" with variance -$%.  
Variance components of dependent variables 
The model in Equation 3 can be also reduced to a “null” model without the observation- and 
participant level explanatory variables &!" 	and 1": 
 
(4)      !!" =	0& +	2" + 	'!" 	 
2" 	~	)(0, -'%) 
'!" 	~	)(0, -$%) 




The null model in Equation 4 is used to estimate the baseline variance components -'% and -$% of 
the dependent variable !!". These variance components are used to calculate the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) of the dependent variable as ICC = -'%/(-$% + -'%). In our case, the ICC represents the 
correlation of responses by each participant, with high values indicating a high similarity between 
responses across rounds. Resulting variance components from the baseline models and the 
corresponding ICCs are presented in Table 10. For all four dependent variables in both groups, variances 
and ICCs suggest that both observation- and participant-level variation contribute a considerable 
proportion to the total variance, with ICCs ranging from .52 to .63. Multilevel analyses thus appear 
appropriate for all dependent variables. 
 
Variables !!" !#" ICC Observations Participants 
Taxpayers 
BehavioralIntention 454.33 678.66 .60 742 331 
ChangeTrust 0.25 0.37 .60 742 331 
ChangePower 0.18 0.30 .63 742 331 
Tax auditors 
BehavioralIntention 453.77 481.24 .52 1285 530 
ChangeTrust 0.19 0.24 .56 1285 530 
ChangePower 0.33 0.37 .53 1285 530 
Table 10: Variance components and intraclass correlation coefficients of the dependent variables. This table shows 
the estimated variances between subjects (Level 1) and the residual within-subject variances (Level 2) of all 
dependent variables used in subsequent analyses. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) reflects the 
correlation of values within participants, i.e. the similarity of the repeated responses by participants to the same 
scale (or item); it is calculated as the ratio of between-subject variance to total variance. Variances and ICCs are 
based on random-intercept baseline models without covariates, estimated with maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
Variable transformations and models 
In our case, the multilevel models include multiple observation- and participant-level explanatory 
variables. Because the four features were newly randomized in each round and thus varied both on the 
participant level (Level 2) as well as the observation level (Level 1), it was necessary to disaggregate 
their variance into these two levels. On Level 1, we thus centered each treatment variable (indicating 
availability of the respective feature) around the participant-means to remove Level 2 variance. On Level 
2, we use the participant-mean of the treatment variable to remove Level 1 variance. Moreover, on Level 
2, all explanatory variables are further centered around the grand mean of observations so that the model 
intercept reflects the overall mean of the dependent variable.  
The original treatment variable DataPrivacy, for example, was transformed as follows, with the 
superscripts PC and GMC denoting participant-centering and grand-mean centering, respectively: 
	
(5)   7898:;<=8>?!"() =	7898:;<=8>?!" −	7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" 
(6)   7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"*+) =	7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" −	7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 




To compute the participant-centered variable 7898:;<=8>?!"()  (Equation 5), we subtract the participant 
mean 7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" from the original values of 7898:;<=8>?!". To compute the grand-mean-centered 
variable 7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"*+)  (Equation 6), we subtract the grand mean of observations 7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 
from the participant means 7898:;A=8>?BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB". We conducted equivalent transformations of all Level 1 
variables as shown in Equation 5, and of Level 2 variables as shown in Equation 6. The full model for 
the dependent variable BehavioralIntention for the group of taxpayers is shown in Equation 7, for the 
group of tax auditors in Equation 8. Models for the other two dependent variables PowerChange, and 





















+ 	2" + 	'!" 
2" 	~	)(0, -'%) 

















*+) + 	2" + 	'!" 
2" 	~	)(0, -'%) 
'!" 	~	)(0, -$%) 
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Fixed effects B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE 
Level 1 (within participants) 
Intercept 2.86*** 0.04  3.41*** 0.05  0.08 0.05  0.28*** 0.06 
%&'&()*+&,-!" 0.19*** 0.06  -0.03 0.06  -0.16** 0.07  -0.07 0.06 
./0*'12)'&*3'-!" 0.22*** 0.06  -0.02 0.05  -0.40*** 0.07  -0.19*** 0.06 
4)&356&)23,-!" 0.01 0.06  0.06 0.06  -0.10 0.07  -0.05 0.06 
7302623023,2!" 0.01 0.06  0.06 0.06  0.13* 0.07  -0.21*** 0.06 
89/30!" 0.00 0.03  -0.04* 0.03  0.05 0.03  0.00 0.03 
Level 2 (between participants) 
%&'&():+&,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" 0.14 0.12  -0.06 0.13  0.09 0.14  -0.15 0.16 
./0:'12)'&:3'-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" 0.34*** 0.12  -0.05 0.13  -0.30** 0.15  -0.22 0.16 
4)&356&)23,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" 0.02 0.11  0.01 0.12  -0.12 0.14  -0.14 0.15 
7302623023,2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" 0.03 0.12  -0.03 0.13  0.09 0.14  -0.11 0.16 
89/305#$" -0.04 0.04  -0.06 0.04  0.02 0.04  0.06 0.05 
4)/5'<&52=*32#$" 0.26*** 0.04  0.08* 0.05  -0.16*** 0.05  -0.22*** 0.06 
(9>2)<&52=*32#$" 0.00 0.05  0.07 0.06  -0.02 0.06  0.08 0.07 
?&=25#$" 0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02  0.04 0.03  -0.02 0.03 
@A6=9-22#$" 0.10 0.09  -0.05 0.10  -0.28*** 0.11  -0.17 0.12 
Random effects σ2  σ2  σ2 
 
σ2 
Between variance (-'%) 0.35  0.44  0.49  0.75 
Residual variance (-32) 0.34  0.33  0.58  0.43 
Observations 742  742  742  742 
Participants 331  331  331  331 
Table 11: Multilevel regressions in the group of taxpayers on the dependent variables PerformanceExpectancy, 
CorrectResults, UncertaintyChange, and CostsChange. The models include a random intercept which controls for 
between-subject variance, effectively disaggregating the variance of the dependent variable into Level 1 variance 
(within subjects, capturing the variation across rounds), and Level 2 variance (capturing the variation across 
participants). Variance of the four randomized treatments DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence (all being assigned the value 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 otherwise) was 
disaggregated by participant-mean centering (denoted by xPC) on Level 1, and by using the participant means on 
Level 2 (denoted by x̄). To facilitate interpretation of the intercept, all variables on Level 2 were entered as grand-
mean-centered (denoted by xGMC). The models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *… p < .10, 
**… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
 
 














Fixed effects B SE  B SE  B SE  B SE 
Level 1 (within participants) 
Intercept 3.20*** 0.03  2.78*** 0.04  -0.05 0.03  0.15*** 0.04 
%&'&()*+&,-!" 0.01 0.04  -0.09* 0.06  0.01 0.05  0.06 0.05 
./0*'12)'&*3'-!" 0.11*** 0.04  -0.57*** 0.05  -0.05 0.05  0.01 0.05 
4)&356&)23,-!" 0.13*** 0.04  0.00 0.06  -0.02 0.05  -0.01 0.05 
7302623023,2!" 0.00 0.04  0.04 0.06  0.08 0.05  -0.40*** 0.05 
89/30!" -0.06*** 0.02  0.03 0.02  -0.01 0.02  -0.02 0.02 
Level 2 (between participants) 
%&'&():+&,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" 0.06 0.09  -0.21** 0.11  0.02 0.10  0.06 0.11 
./0:'12)'&:3'-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" 0.11 0.09  -0.26** 0.11  -0.16 0.10  -0.13 0.11 
4)&356&)23,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" -0.06 0.09  -0.30*** 0.11  0.13 0.10  0.05 0.11 
7302623023,2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;#$" 0.03 0.09  -0.04 0.10  -0.05 0.09  -0.31*** 0.11 
89/305#$" -0.05** 0.02  -0.06** 0.03  -0.01 0.03  -0.03 0.03 
4)/5'<&52=*32#$" 0.05 0.04  -0.03 0.05  0.02 0.05  0.04 0.06 
(9>2)<&52=*32#$" 0.10** 0.04  0.35*** 0.05  -0.04 0.04  -0.09* 0.05 
Random effects σ2  σ2  σ2 
 
σ2 
Between variance (B%&) 0.29  0.36  0.29  0.51 
Residual variance (B'&) 0.33  0.60  0.49  0.46 
Observations 1285  1285  1285  1285 
Participants 530  530  530  530 
Table 12: Multilevel regressions in the group of tax auditors on the dependent variables PerformanceExpectancy, 
CorrectResults, UncertaintyChange, and CostsChange. The models include a random intercept which controls for 
between-subject variance, effectively disaggregating the variance of the dependent variable into Level 1 variance 
(within participants, capturing the variation across rounds), and Level 2 variance (capturing the variation across 
participants). Variance of the four randomized treatments DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence (all being assigned the value 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 otherwise) was 
disaggregated by participant-mean centering (denoted by xPC) on Level 1, and by using the participant means on 
Level 2 (denoted by x̄). To facilitate interpretation of the intercept, all variables on Level 2 were entered as grand-
mean-centered (denoted by xGMC). The models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *… p < .10, 
**… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
  








Intention  TrustChange 
 
PowerChange 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 18.97*** 2.10  -0.29*** 0.05  0.31*** 0.04 
DataPrivacy 11.48*** 1.67  0.20*** 0.04  -0.03 0.05 
AuditCertainty 13.59*** 2.08  0.18*** 0.05  -0.01 0.05 
Transparency 5.96*** 1.91  0.05 0.05  0.06 0.03 
Independence 4.35** 2.12  0.02 0.05  0.02 0.04 
Participant fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 742  742  742 
Participants 331  331  331 
Table 13: Fixed effects regressions using the full sample from taxpayers on the dependent variables 
BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange. The models include dummy variables for participant and 
round intercepts which controls for between-subject and between-round variance. Coefficients thus only capture 
the effects of feature changes across rounds. Features DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence were entered as dummy variables, assigned 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 if 







Intention  TrustChange 
 
PowerChange 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 57.26*** 1.69  0.13*** 0.04  0.09** 0.04 
DataPrivacy -0.18 1.43  0.05 0.03  -0.06 0.04 
AuditCertainty -15.41*** 1.82  0.05 0.04  -0.43*** 0.05 
Transparency -0.07 1.44  0.12*** 0.03  -0.04 0.04 
Independence -1.40 1.50  -0.02 0.03  0.03 0.04 
Participant fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1285  1285  1285 
Participants 530  530  530 
Table 14: Fixed effects regressions using the full sample from tax auditors on the dependent variables 
BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange. The models include dummy variables for participant and 
round intercepts which controls for between-subject and between-round variance. Coefficients thus only capture 
the effects of feature changes across rounds. Features DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence were entered as dummy variables, assigned 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 
otherwise. Reported standard errors are participant-cluster robust. *… p < .10, **… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
 
 







Intention  TrustChange 
 
PowerChange 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 22.67*** 2.10  -0.29*** 0.06  0.33*** 0.06 
DataPrivacy 11.35*** 2.00  0.23*** 0.06  -0.06 0.06 
AuditCertainty 9.06*** 2.04  0.17*** 0.06  0.04 0.05 
Transparency 4.04* 2.15  0.08 0.06  0.04 0.05 
Independence 3.78* 2.04  -0.01 0.06  0.03 0.05 
Participant fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 592  592  592 
Participants 331  331  331 
Table 15: Fixed effects regressions using the first two rounds from taxpayers on the dependent variables 
BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange. The models include dummy variables for participant and 
round intercepts which controls for between-subject and between-round variance. Coefficients thus only capture 
the effects of feature changes across rounds. Features DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence were entered as dummy variables, assigned 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 







Intention  TrustChange 
 
PowerChange 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 56.77*** 2.03  0.18*** 0.04  0.01 0.06 
DataPrivacy -1.73 1.84  0.05 0.04  0.00 0.05 
AuditCertainty -11.67*** 1.91  0.06 0.04  -0.30*** 0.06 
Transparency 1.11 1.73  0.08** 0.04  -0.04 0.05 
Independence -1.52 1.75  -0.07* 0.04  0.04 0.05 
Participant fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 971  971  971 
Participants 530  530  530 
Table 16: Fixed effects regressions using the first two rounds from tax auditors on the dependent variables 
BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange. The models include dummy variables for participant and 
round intercepts which controls for between-subject and between-round variance. Coefficients thus only capture 
the effects of feature changes across rounds. Features DataPrivacy, AuditCertainty, Transparency, and 
Independence were entered as dummy variables, assigned 1 if the feature was presented as available, or 0 
otherwise. Reported standard errors are participant-cluster robust. *… p < .10, **… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
 
 






<2ℎ&+:9)&=73'23':93;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  4)/5'1ℎ&3D2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  (9>2)1ℎ&3D2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 30.64*** 5.11  -0.31*** 0.12  0.28*** 0.10 
%&'&():+&,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 1.38 4.73  0.11 0.11  -0.05 0.10 
./0:'12)'&:3'-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 10.54** 4.90  0.25** 0.11  0.06 0.10 
4)&356&)23,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 4.64 4.59  0.08 0.11  0.01 0.09 
7302623023,2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; -2.41 4.70  0.05 0.11  0.13 0.10 
Averaged observations 742  742  742 
Observations in model 
(= participants) 331  331 
 331 
Table 17: Regressions on BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange using mean values of dependent 
and independent variables from the full sample of taxpayers. All variables included in the models are mean values 
of variables across rounds (denoted by x̄). Coefficients thus only capture the effects of the average treatment 





<2ℎ&+:9)&=73'23':93;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  4)/5'1ℎ&3D2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;  (9>2)1ℎ&3D2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 54.99*** 3.44  0.14* 0.08  0.20** 0.09 
%&'&():+&,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; -4.84 3.31  0.01 0.07  -0.21** 0.09 
./0:'12)'&:3'-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; -5.50* 3.34  0.08 0.07  -0.16* 0.09 
4)&356&)23,-;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; -3.45 3.29  -0.08 0.07  -0.20** 0.09 
7302623023,2;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; -1.30 3.25  0.06 0.07  -0.10 0.09 
Averaged observations 1285  1285  1285 
Observations in model 
(= participants) 530  530 
 530 
Table 18: Regressions on BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange using mean values of dependent 
and independent variables from the full sample of tax auditors. All variables included in the models are mean 
values of variables across rounds (denoted by x̄). Coefficients thus only capture the effects of the average treatment 







Intention  TrustChange 
 
PowerChange 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 30.69*** 3.98  -0.33*** 0.09  0.33*** 0.09 
DataPrivacy 4.94 3.52  0.30*** 0.08  -0.01 0.08 
AuditCertainty 11.59*** 3.53  0.26*** 0.08  -0.03 0.08 
Transparency 6.30* 3.53  0.13 0.08  0.03 0.08 
Independence -7.97** 3.54  -0.11 0.08  0.06 0.08 
Observations in model 
(= participants) 331  331 
 331 
Table 19: Regressions on BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange using the first round only from 
taxpayers. All variables are entered as the original values from the first round of each participant. *… p < .10, 
**… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
 
 







Intention  TrustChange 
 
PowerChange 
 B SE  B SE  B SE 
Intercept 56.20*** 2.83  0.12* 0.06  0.04 0.08 
DataPrivacy -4.51* 2.54  0.04 0.06  -0.14* 0.07 
AuditCertainty -8.53*** 2.54  0.07 0.06  -0.18** 0.07 
Transparency -2.54 2.54  0.03 0.06  -0.12 0.07 
Independence 3.16 2.54  0.09 0.06  0.11 0.07 
Observations in model 
(= participants) 530  530 
 530 
Table 20: Regressions on BehavioralIntention, TrustChange, and PowerChange using the first round only from 
tax auditors. All variables are entered as the original values from the first round of each participant. *… p < .10, 
**… p < .05, ***… p < .01. 
 




Appendix 4: Experimental survey on E-Audits 
In the following sections, some questions were (not) shown depending on previous answers. For the purpose of 
readability, these alternative questions are printed in grey. Also printed in grey are headings of question blocks 
which were not visible to participants. The original survey was in German language. 
 
Beginning of Block: Introduction 
 
Dear participant,  
 
in a research project at the ###University### (Prof. ###), we are currently conducting a survey 
concerning “tax audits in Austria”. In this survey, we inquire about motivations and opinions about 
Austrian tax authorities and the tax audit methods used. Therefore, we would be glad to hear your 
opinion on that topic. 
The survey is conducted by ###University### and all answers are strictly anonymous. Answers 
cannot be traced back to individuals. After the survey is concluded, the data will be used for scholarly 
purposes. The aggregated results will also be used for the political debate to enhance future tax audits. 
Your participation is, thus, very valuable. Completing the survey will take 10-15 minutes. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the survey, please feel free to contact us via ### @###.at. 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
End of Block: Introduction 
 
Beginning of Block: Demographics 
 





What is your age? 






o over 69 
 





What is your occupation (multiple selections possible)? 
o Officer of the financial authorities  
o Entrepreneur 




Do you have a tax related position in your company? 
o Yes, on the board of directors 
o Yes, as employee 
o Yes, in research 
o No 
 
Do you conduct a tax related activity? 
o Yes, as self-employed tax advisor 
o Yes, as employee in a tax advisory company 
o Yes, I’m a tax expert in a company, which doesn’t offer tax advisory services 
o No 
 
End of Block: Demographics 
 
Beginning of Block: Income/Advisor/Audit 
 




Which sources of income did you have in 2018? (multiple selection possible) 
o Income from agriculture and forestry 
o Income from self-employment 
o Income from trade operations 
o Income from employment 
o Income from capital assets 
o Income from renting and leasing  
o Other income 
 
 
Which legal form does your enterprise have? 
Which legal form does the enterprise you work for have? 
o Sole entrepreneur 
o Civil law company (GesbR) 
o General partnership (OG) 
o Limited partnership (KG) 
o Limited partnership with a limited liability company as partner (GmbH & Co KG) 
o Limited liability company (GmbH) 
o Corporation (AG) 








Please indicate the turnover of your enterprise in 2018 (according to the VAT Act). 
Please indicate the turnover of the enterprise you work for in 2018 (according to the VAT Act). 
Please indicate your turnover 2018 from income from renting and leasing. 
 
o below € 35.000  
o between € 35.000 and € 100.000 
o between € 100.000 and € 220.000 
o between € 220.000 and € 700.000 
o between € 700.000 and € 10 millions 
o between € 10 millions and € 40 Millions 
o between € 40 millions and € 200 Millions 
o between € 200 millions and € 1 billion 
o more than € 1 billion 
 
Do you use the services of a tax advisor or accountant? (multiple selection possible) 
Does the company you work for use the services of a tax advisor or accountant? (multiple selection 
possible) 
 
o Tax advisor  
o Accountant  
 
 
Please indicate your knowledge in Austrian tax law on a scale from 1 (layperson) to 7 (expert)? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  




Please indicate your knowledge in accounting on a scale from 1 (layperson) to 7 (expert)? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  




layperson o  o  o  o  o  o  o  expert 
 
 
Did you ever experience a tax audit in your enterprise? 





Which sort of tax audit did your enterprise experience? (multiple selection possible) 
Which sort of tax audit did the enterprise you work for experience? (multiple selection possible) 
o Full in-person tax audit (Außenprüfung)  
o Paper tax audit  
o Other ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Income/Advisor/Audit 
 
Beginning of Block: Message Role 
Depending on the answers given above, each participant was assigned the most suitable role for the remainder 
of the survey. 
 
Please answer all following questions from your point of view as an entrepreneur. 
Please answer all following questions from your point of view as a landlord. 
Please answer all following questions from your point of view as an employee of the tax authorities. 
Please answer all following questions from your point of view as an employee of the company you 
work for. 
Please answer all following questions from your point of view as a tax advisor. 
 
End of Block: Message Role 
 
Beginning of Block: Baseline 
 




How strongly do you agree with the following statements? 
 
Austrian tax offices… 
 
 Completely disagree  Completely agree 
     1      2      3      4      5 
...are 





o  o  o  o  o  
...act in the 
interest of 












o  o  o  o  o  
...impose high 
penalties for 
tax evasion. o  o  o  o  o  
...are 
competent.  o  o  o  o  o  
...work 














Paying taxes in Austria... 
 
 Completely disagree  Completely agree 
     1     2     3     4     5 
...is 
complicated  o  o  o  o  o  
...requires a lot 
of work.  o  o  o  o  o  
...is very 
costly.  o  o  o  o  o  
...is linked to 
high legal 









I pay my taxes correctly... 
 
 Completely disagree  Completely agree 
      1      2      3      4      5 
...as a matter 
of course.  o  o  o  o  o  
...because it is 
my duty as a 
citizen.  o  o  o  o  o  
...to support 
the state and 
its citizens.  o  o  o  o  o  
...because the 
risk of being 
audited is too 
high.  










o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Baseline 
 
Beginning of Block: Scenario 
 




The Austrian Ministry of Finance is planning the introduction of a digital, alternative form of tax 
audits. We would like to know, how you perceive that audit process. 
 
- Taxpayers can voluntarily use the planned digital audit process.  
- In the process, detailed accounting data can be uploaded to the financial authorities electronically 
via FinanzOnline. 
- To use the process, it is necessary that the books are kept with a qualified bookkeeping system 
(e.g. BMD, RZL, DATEV, DVO, etc.) 
- The uploaded data is then automatically audited. 
- If the system identifies irregularities, further inquiries are automatically generated and clarifying 
information can be uploaded. 
- The process is finished as soon as all questions concerning irregularities have been answered or if 
no irregularities were detected. 
- The process can be aborted by taxpayers at any time. 
- Data from the audit process can be used to automatically assess the taxes due. 
 
Moreover, the audit process has four special features, which you find below. Please read them 
carefully: 
 




Data Privacy: Yes 
After finishing the audit process, all data supplied to the tax authorities will be deleted permanently.  
 
Data Privacy: No 
Accounting data provided by the taxpayer will be stored by the tax authorities. Data will not be 
deleted, even if the audit process is aborted. 
 
Transparency: Yes 




Taxpayers are only informed about the result of the digital audit. No additional information about the 
audit process is provided. 
 
Audit Certainty: Yes 
After a tax return has been successfully generated based on the uploaded accounting data, future tax  
audits for the respective year of assessment are prohibited. This only applies if potential irregularities 
in the accounting data can be clarified online.  
 
Audit Certainty: No 
Even if a tax return has been successfully generated in the digital audit process, a conventional tax 
audit can still take place at a later time. 
 
 





Taxpayers may use the process independently and without the assistance of tax professionals.  
 
Independence: No 
To use the digital audit process, taxpayers need to be represented by a tax advisor, because only tax 
advisors can upload accounting data. 
 
The following question was displayed according to the role assigned to participants. 
 
How likely would you use the described audit process for your next tax declaration? (in percent) 
How likely would you use or recommend utilization of the described digital audit process for the 
tax declaration of your company or the company you work for? (in percent) 
How likely would you endorse the described digital audit process? (in percent) 







How strongly do you agree with the following statements concerning the described audit 
process? 
 
 Completely disagree  Completely agree 
     1     2     3     4     5 
I believe the 
audit process 
is easy to use.  o  o  o  o  o  





o  o  o  o  o  








o  o  o  o  o  
I believe the 
results of the  
audit process 
are correct.  








How would your attitude change if the described audit process was introduced?  
  







0  + 
 
...are less 












...act less in 
the interest 
of taxpayers. o  o  o  o  o  

































competent. o  o  o  o  o  ...are more competent. 
...work less 


















How would your assessment change, if the described audit process was introduced?  
    





            – 





            + 
 
...is less 
complicated.. o  o  o  o  o  ...is more complicated. 
...requires less 
additional 






costly. o  o  o  o  o  ...is more costly. 
...is linked to 
less legal 
uncertainty. o  o  o  o  o  





End of Block: Scenario 
  
Beginning of Block: Continue Block 1 
 
You finished evaluating the first scenario of the digital audit process.  
  
Subsequently, you will find another variation of the audit process, in which only the four special 
features change (Data Privacy, Transparency, Audit Certainty, Independence). 
  
The questions for evaluating the audit process remain unchanged. 
 
End of Block: Continue Block 1 
 
Beginning of Block: Continue Block 2 
 
You finished evaluating two variations of the digital audit process. Would you like to continue 
evaluating another variation? The more variations you evaluate, the better we can capture your 
assessments, which would help us a lot. You can finish the survey after each variation. 
 




In the next variation, only the four special features will change (Data Privacy, Transparency, Audit 
Certainty, Independence). 
 
The questions for evaluating the audit process remain unchanged. 
o YES, I would like to evaluate another variation. 
o NO, I want to finish the survey. 
 
End of Block: Continue Block 2 
 
Beginning of Block: Continue Block 3 
 
You finished evaluating three variations of the digital audit process. Would you like to continue 
evaluating another variation? You can finish the survey after each variation. 
 
In the next variation, only the four special features will change (Data Privacy, Transparency, Audit 
Certainty, Independence). 
 
The questions for evaluating the audit process remain unchanged. 
o YES, I would like to evaluate another variation. 
o NO, I want to finish the survey. 
 
End of Block: Continue Block 3 
 
Beginning of Block: Continue Block 4 
 
You finished evaluating four variations of the digital audit process. Would you like to continue 
evaluating another variation? You can finish the survey after each variation. 
 
In the next variation, only the four special features will change (Data Privacy, Transparency, Audit 
Certainty, Independence). 
 
The questions for evaluating the audit process remain unchanged. 
o YES, I would like to evaluate another variation. 
o NO, I want to finish the survey. 
 
End of Block: Continue Block 4 
 
Beginning of Block: Open Questions 
 




To what extent were you already familiar with the topic „digital audit processes of book accounts“ 
before this survey? (e.g. SAF-T) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Not at all 







What did you particularly like about the described new audit process? Please enter up to 5 









Which concerns do you have about the described new audit process? Please enter up to 5 





















End of Block: Open Questions 
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